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Kierkegaard as a religious genius is un-readable, and point
out what Kierkegaard is attempting to do,

So often, Kier

kegaard is regarded the father (in wedlock or out) of existen
tialism and as such considered to be fantastically difficult.
I am now convinced that the truth of the matter rests rather
in the fact that Christianity is so non-existent in our cul
ture that any Christian would be difficult to understand.
Admittedly, Kierkegaard as a Christian felt it necessary to
point out, with all the subjective manipulations necessary,
the weaknesses of any logical system of living that precludes
the infinite.

But this is simply for those who need such an

investigation in order to be indirectly confronted with the
possibility of religion,

The pseudonymous authors demand

as much tedious reading as one can endure; until one is fin
ally exhausted outside the category of the infinite.

The

simplicity of the Edifying ^Discourses does not, however, de
mand such subjective endurance.
My intention is to let both the Kierkegaard of the
pseudonymous literature and the Kierkegaard of the Edifying
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The resulting insights of this paper could be summarised
in these sentences:
1.

Kierkegaard is from beginning to end a religious
author.

2.

A proper rendering of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous
means of communication demands an understanding
of Socratic irony.

3.

The secret of understanding Kierkegaard's aesthetic
authorship lies in the comparison of the pseudonymous
literature and the Edifying Discourses.

4.

For Kierkegaard the passion of the believer is con
cerned not with time, place or state of being but
with the infinite.
Time, place and state of being
serve to strengthen the inner m a n . •

5.

The believer has overcome the future, the non-be
liever is its slave.

6.

If repetition is not possible religion is simply an
adjunct to philosophy.

7.

The reality of conversion for Kierkegaard consists
of orthodox Christianity which is the only real sub
stitute for modern doubt.

iv
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PREFACE

The nature of Kierkegaard1s authorship demands special
care.

To quote the author of the Edifying Discourses and

then to quote one of the pseudonymous authors as if there is
no distinction is to destroy the delicate balance and earnest
purpose of Kierkegaard's overall genius.

In order to respect

the entire production, I have chosen to distinguish the var
ious writers within Kierkegaard's authorship.

When the name

Kierkegaard is used, I will be referring to that man who is the
author of an MA thesis, the author of several pseudonymous works,
and the author of the Edifying Discourses.

When the name Sj^ren

Kierkegaard is used I will be referring to that man of faith
who is the author of the Edifying Discourses.

When I use the

title Magister Kierkegaard I will be referring to the writer
of the MA thesis entitled The Concept of Irony.

And when a

particular pseudonymous name is used, I will be referring to
that specific pseudonymous personality.

If no such distiniction

is made a critical appraisal is impossible and the sharpness
of Kierkegaard's genius is melted down into the ambiguity of
mediocre generality.
In one way, the entire purpose of this paper is to let
the authorship of Kierkegaard be what it is.

The confusion

1 The works are: Either/Or, Pear and Trembling, Reoe tition
and Johannes Climacus or, Se Omnibus Dubit.ar.curr.
r,
vi
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surrounding Kierkegaard's appeal and the tiresome adjective
of existential attributed so often to him makes it evident
that some distinction must be made somewhere.

Kierkegaard

himself witnessed a radical distinction in his own division
of authorship.

Specifying this division as a means of re

vealing Kierkegaard's purpose is my intention.

Once the

apologetic nature of Kierkegaard's task is made central, undue
concern for Kierkegaard1s duplicity of authorship is set by
the wayside and Kierkegaard can get on with his God-given task
of re-introducing Christianity into Christendom.

vii
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An Initial Look at
Kierkegaard 1s Poetic Structure
Chapter 1.
Bither/Or:

Hermeneutics

A Fragment of Life edited by Victor Eremita in

two volumes was published February 20, lS43«

Less than three

months later on May 16, 1843 Two Edifying Discourses signed
S^ren Kierkegaard was published.

Repetition;

An Essay in

Experimental Psychology written by Constantine Constantius and
Fear and Trembling;

A Dialectical Lyric written by Johannes

de Silentio were published on October 16, 1843 .

On that same

day in 1843 Three Edifying Discourses signed Sjdren Kierkegaard
was published.
Comparing this duplicity of publication, in order to dis
cern Kierkegaard’s authentication of the problem "how one is
to become a Christian" constitutes the matter of this essay.
Or, in other words, the question being asked here is:

"In what

sense does there exist an apologetic in Kierkegaard’s initial
aesthetic authorship?"

The precise interest of the undertaking

arises from the fact that Kierkegaard considered himself to be,
from beginning to end, a religious author.

By its very defin

ition within Kierkegaard’s vocabulary, religion refers to some
thing other than philosophy, psychology, sociology, poetry,
history, music, ethics or humanism.

Understanding religion in
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this manner, Kierkegaard is open to the possibility of traditional
apologetics.^
Kierkegaard’s genius is directed toward a single goal, though
it expresses itself in two distinct ways.

This is made evident

by the split publications of the pseudonymous literature and the
Edifying Discourses.

Each word used by the pseudonymous surro

gates is tinderstood in relation to German culture.

The same word

used by Sjs/ren Kierkegaard is understood in the context of Christian
tradition which receives its -wisdom from God and not the nearest
culture, be it grand or insignificant.
Translation of these words from the Danish into English
(or any other language) has the responsibility of first of all
being understood in the context of the Danish word itself.

If

the Danish word is to be interpreted solely within the framework
of German culture (Hegel and Goethe) then it loses the context
of Kierkegaard's poetic.

Kierkegaard's Danish vocabulary like

that of Dante's Italian is at work establishing Christianity
within a linguistic framework.

(This is the job of apologetics.)

Kierkegaard states that he is witnessing the reintroduction of
Christianity into Christendom.

He does this by abandoning all

German-Homantic overtones in vocabulary and by re-establishing
the meanings of words in strict accord to the one Christian
tradition.

For Kierkegaard Christianity is only one thing and

1 Traditional apologetics is understood in the words of
Peter and John;
"So they called them and charged them not to
speak or teach at all in the name of Jesus,
But Peter and John
answered them, ’Whether it is right in the sight of God to listen
to you rather than to God, you must judge:
for we cannot but
speak of what we have seen and heard.5" Acts 4 :3.5-20,
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not something else.

If the words used by a culture destroy this

one meaning of Christianity they must be overcome (this again,
is the precise job of apologetics ), not by mediating them back
2
into Christianity as if such a process is possible but by total
ly rejecting their initial assumptions.

It is one thing to

mediate and mediate and mediate the dialectics of a system of
logic with the impossible hope of establishing a proper place
for religion (which is anything more than logical) and another
thing to edify within a Christian apologetic in hope of witnes
sing an already existent Christian Tradition.

For a Christian

apologetics to be possible a one-ness with Christian Tradition
is demanded.

Otherwise the apologetics does not find its mean

ing and strength in the heart of Christianity but somewhere else.
(Such as in religious customs, new churches, national identies,
humanism, agnosticism, pluralism, or personal feelings.)
Kierkegaard accomplishes a Christian apologetic positively
in the Edifying Discourses where he establishes contemporary
words in their relationship to Christian Tradition; and when
he coins new words which have their basis in something other
than historical German Romanticism.
tion.")

(One such word is "repeti

In the pseudonjnnous literature he accomplishes this

negatively by showing the interesting weaknesses of the finitebound Germanic vocabulary, left floating about in the subjective
2 As if the breeding of 10,000 chickens would finally
produce a German short-hair pointer.
I have known some people
who think such a process is possible because the pointer
happened to like chickens.
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ambiguity of a "Christendom."
The apologetic nature of Kierkegaard's initial authorship
is not concerned with leading one by argument directly into
Christianity.

Nor is it concerned with rejecting all serious

use of language for religious expression.

It is neither an

authoritarian mandate, nor a holier-than-thou nominalism.
What James Collins says about Kierkegaard's aesthetic
stage of authorship is partially true:
But it must be remembered that this religious
reason behind the use of the pseudonym
neither dominant nor incisive, when the aes
thetic project was started.
Yet Kierkegaard's insights unfcld in such comprehensive and
dialectical flashes that to say that the "religious reason was
neither dominant nor incisive" is to put an order into Kierke
gaard's authorship which is itself neither dominant nor incisive
at this stage in the authorship.

A proper rendering of the

aesthetic stage of Kierkegaard's writing requires neither an
ordering nor a re-ordering but rather an aesthetical testimony.^Several categorical determinants have been imposed on
Kierkegaard's authorship in order to better understand it.
help.

Plot is absent and the criss-cross of dialectics does not

respond to the facile hand of form criticism.
3
p. 42.

Pew

It is precisely

James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Chicago, 1953),

4 In a similar fashion you would not be witnessing the
intended aesthetical beauty of E Vinci's "Last Supper" if you
subjected your analysis simply to its mathematical exactness.
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the matter of form that Kierkegaard is seeking to put back into
its place.

Or as editor Victor Eremita puts it:

These papers (of authors A and B) have afforded me
an insight into the lives of two men, which has
confirmedf-my hunch that the external is not the
internal.
Taking the cue from Kierkegaard, Collins presents the four
stages in Kierkegaard's thought as:

aesthetical, ethical,

religion A (Immanent), and religion B (Transcendent).

These

stages were derived from Kierkegaard himself, but of themselves
they

could imposean cverly-philosophical and misleading process

of development on his authorship.

Taken as a whole I am

not

convinced that Collins, at this point, escapes his own philo
sophical tendency to restructure or structure improperly the
legitimate aesthetic present in Kierkegaard's poetic produc
tivity.
Kierkegaard sums up the whole of his aesthetic work in
five statements:
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

That "Christendom" is a prodigious illusion.
That if real success is to attend the effort
to bring man to a definite position, one must
first of all take pains to find Him where he
is and begin there.
The illusion that religion and Christianity
are something one first has recourse to when
one grows older.
That even if a man will not follow where one
endeavours to lead him, one thing it is still
possible to do for him— compel him to take
notice.
That the whole of the aesthetic work, viewed
in relation to the work as a whole is a de
ception— -understanding this word, however in a

5 Spren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Volume I, Translated by
David F. Swenson ana Lillian Marvin Swenson with revisions and
a foreword by Howard A. Johnson (Garden City, 1953), p.4.
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special sense,
(,,,One can deceive a person
for the truth’s sake, and, to recall old
Socrates, one can deceive a person into the
truth.)D
r~i

These later observations 1 of Kierkegaard are helpful in retro
spect and make it evident that Kierkegaard has a decisive pur
pose in his aesthetic authorship.

They should not, however,

distract the reader from the diverse and dialectical character
of his writings which took by storm the cultured Hegelians.
The means of communication employed by Kierkegaard in the
pseudonymous half of the aesthetic composition is indirect.
Just as Socrates uses indirect communication in a situation
where vain conceit has first to be disposed of, Kierkegaard
uses indirect communication in a situation where the vain con
ceit of Christendom had to be disposed of before one was able
to talk of Christianity.
For Socrates the proper job of philosophy was to
away all idle words and let the truth stand as

it

is.

strip
Often,

to reach the heart of an argument, it was necessary for Socrates
to blow into full scale the deceit which others held as the
truth.

It was not until those deceived finally saw to what

their assumptions led that they were whiling to admit of their
confusion.

This cutting away of all straw thought led Socrates

to the absolute negative, which was, moreover, that with which
6 Spren Kierkegaard, The Point of View of My Work as an
Author, translated with introduction and notes by Walter Lowrie
Thew York, 1962), op. 22-33.
7 The Point of View of My Work as an Author was written
by Kierkegaard in Ibko and not published until four years
after his death.
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lie started.

For Kierkegaard, Socrates'weakness was that he

could get no further than the absolute negative or irony.

And

yet, this was also his strength, in that it enabled him to see
clearly where the problem did not lie.

This much of Socrates

Kierkegaard regarded as most enlightening and really superior
to that category of negativity in Hegel which was regarded as
a result and so as having some type of logical necessity.
Kierkegaard was convinced that by means of irony Socrates had
held at bay the ready wolf of idealism.

Hegel was far less

fortunate.
The pseudonymous authors parallel Socrates' agitators.
The author of the Edifying Discourses states Socrates' reply.
Just as in the plays of Plato, the agitators of Socrates are
generally self-defeating, so with the pseudonymous writers.
Of themselves these multifarious proteges only expose their
growing weaknesses.
The power of the pseudonymous combatants consists in
their ironic use of the Hegelian framework.

Whereas Hegel

used the dialectic to mediate further, the pseudonymous per
sonalities use irony to allow the dialectic to destroy itself.
By using the absolute negative, which is the meaning of Socratic
irony, the pseudonymous writers attempt to come to grips with
life.

The intriguing method of Kierkegaard finds him granting

the pseudonymous muses just enough Socratic irony to make
Hegelian philosophy appear ridiculous and yet not so much as to
suggest that Socratic irony is in any positive way sufficient
for man to break through to existence.

This is the reason that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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so often the reader of Either/Or finds Authors A and 3 so en
lightening in destroying the shallow beauty of romanticism and
yet so distracting in leaving the reader nothing else*
The Edifying Discourses can be read apart from any consider
ation of the pseudonymous literature.

(Just as, in a way, mon-

asticism can stand as a witness of God quite apart from the rest
of the Middle Age society.)

The pseudonymous literature on the

other hand has no real independent existence, and of itself,
leaves the reader juggling immediacy and reflection.

Once the

direct communication of the Edifying Discourses is revealed
the ironic lack of positive expression found in the pseudonymous
literature is radically overcome.
There remains one important difference in comparing Socrates
and the author of the Edifying Discourses.

Socrates used irony

to keep realitjr open to the possibility of understanding by
means of absolute negativity.

S^ren Kierkegaard used irony to

enable reality to be understood by means of the ''religious."
This is the precise moment of Kierkegaard's apologetic.

Had

Kierkegaard only produced the pseudonymous literature, only
negatively would he have witnessed religion or the spirit of
Christianity.

With the publication of the Edifying Discourses

the absolute nothingness of Socratic irony is radically overcome
O
from without.
Religion positively introduced into the world
by Christianity provided both a question and an answer that the

As I hear, I judge,
8 "Of myself I can do nothing.
and my judgement is just because I seek not my own will, out
the will of him who sent me,i! John 5 130
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Greeks on their own could not have appropriated.
To begin with, Kierkegaard respected the thought of
•Socrates for its openness to the possibility of the infinite,
and therefore to religion and more specifically, Christianity.
Nevertheless, Greek thought was quite unable to complete itself
due to its lack of the ’’principle of spirit” which was introq

duced into the world with Christianity.

In Kierkegaard’s

thought this negative possibility of religion present in
Socrates was quite a different thing than the systematic medi
ated religion present in the philosophy of Hegel.

This later

made religion and therefore Christianity an impossibility.

How

Hegelian philosophy ruled out the possibility of Christianity
is a constant theme in Kierkegaard's authorship.

Since Hegel

regarded religion as something mediated within his system, the
mystery of God lost its infinity and became the un-mysterious
subject of finite investigation.
S/ren Kierkegaard's effort was directed at leaving a door
open to the infinite.

The exhaustive categories of Hegel were

splendid skeletons for a systematizing of the idea, but no
where in this system of thought was there room for anything but
the logical.

Bound to the

dom was impossible for the

finite, as alogical necessity, free
individual.

With freedom an

9 Author A discusses this ’’principle of spirit” introduced
by Christianity in Vol. 1 of Either/Or:
”As principle, as power,
as a self-contained system, sensuousness was first posited by
Christianityj to add still another qualification, which will,
perhaps, show more emphatically what I mean: as a determinant
of spirit, sensuousness was first posited by Christianity.
This Is quite natural, for Christianity is spirit, and spirit
is the positive principle which Christianity has brought into
the world.” (Either/Or, Vol. 1, pp.59-60}
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impossibility, religion cannot exist.

Either the individual

in light of the crowd can side with the system and so be chained
by the logical necessity of thought or the individual can, in
light of the eternal, side with existence which in its natural
depth is open to the infinite.
alternative.

There can be no compromising

Any mediation of these two positions simply is a

restatement of the first.
The whole aesthetic literature is more at pains to show why
the German romantic conceptualisations of reality are unable to
ask the religious question (or to get even as far as Socrates)
than offer a Christian answer.

Kierkegaard's task at this stage

is to point man back to reality.

If Kierkegaard was to accept

either the Hegelian system of thought or a local variety of
Hegelianized Christianity, he knew that historical Christianity
would be impossible.

Using the Hegelian vocabulary, Kierkegaard

edifies his readers by re-establishing this vocabulary within
historical Christianity.

He accomplishes this on the one hand

by allowing the pseudonymous high priests to present the roman
tic personality as dialectically mediated, and on the other by
allowing the author of the Edifying Discourses to edify the be
liever.

The pseudonymous muses write for the cultural sieves

who refuse to listen to anything which does not rest busily with
in the meshes of its own thinking.
The method of Kierkegaard's authorship takes the ideas of
Hegelian philosophy, turns them into personalities, and lets
them be what they can.

As consistent characters reflected

through experimental psychology and as immediate dispositions
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thought of categorically, these pseudonymous appurtenances were
to he initially and finally self-destructive.
authors cannot break through to existence.
to end to the static poll

The pseudonymous

Bound from beginning

of idealism and romanticism these

writers are closed to the possibility of religion.

As tempera

ments sealed off to the religious, and so from the infinite,
these characterizations are to be developed (later in Kierke
gaard's authorship) into the categories of despair and sin.
Although religion and Christianity are spoken of explicitly
within the aesthetic literature, it is obvious that the pseusonymous authors are unable to assert anything edifying about
either.
My personality is a presupposition psychologically
necessary to force him out (the young man in
Repetition) while my personality will never be able
to get to the point he has reached, for the prim
itive power by which he advances is a new and
different factor.10
...but I admit also that I have not the courage
for it, (namely the movement of faith) and that
I renounce gladly any prospect of getting further—
if only it were possible that in any way, however
late, I might get so far.
The very choice of Kierkegaard to use the various pseudonyms
is an indication of the seriousness of his apologetic.

One

could not be a Christian-of-sorts and be a Christian absolutely
in the same breath!
10 S^ren Kierkegaard, Repetition, Translated with Intro
duction and Notes by Walter Lowrie (New York, 1964), p. 137.
11 S/ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and Sickness unto
Death, Translated with Introductions and Notes by Walter Lowrie
(Garden City, 1954), p. 124.
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In order to edify, the author of the Edifying Discourses
must find man where he is.

The precise location of man assumed

in the pseudonymous writings is within the Hegel-Goethian
framework.

In this ideally historical location man is not open

to the possibility of religion and the
absurd.
ers?

hope

of edification is

How then is Kierkegaard to speak edifyingly to his read

First he clears the way with the pseudonymous authorship

by showing precisely what is not, and cannot be, edifying.

The

location of the pseudonymous authorship as prior to the Edifying
Discourses is in the publicfe notion only.

In fact, the pseudony

mous and those signed S^ren Kierkegaard were published simultan
eously.

The underlying purpose of the entire aesthetic authorship

is to enable the individual to be edified.
works are first in order of importance.

Thus the edifying

The Edifying Discourses

of themselves do not need the Hegelian vocabulary.

Rather con

temporary man needs the Hegelian vocabulary in order to be found
where he is.

In fact, from the beginning many readers of Kierke

gaard are much more pleased with the pseudonymous authors and as
a rule probably are not familiar at ail with his Edifying Discourses.
Socrates let every man use the words he found to be meaningful in
order to state his case.

Yet when the discussion was over the

words used by the opponents of Socrates were found to mean nothing.
Kierkegaard lets man speak in the finitude of his own words (the
pseudonymous authorship)
12

12

and then turns around and allows the

0 man, how long shall my honour suffer shame?
How long will you love vain words, and seek after lies?
Psalms 4:2
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the possibility of the infinite to edify.

11

In the Edifying Discourses nevertheless it cannot be as
sumed that S^ren Kierkegaard's apologetic is concerned more with
the specifically "Christian" than with the possibility of religion
in general.

(Or in a sense natural religion.)

The aesthetic

literature taken in its entirety is an attempt to illuminate the
problem of "what it is to become a Christian" and in no direct
way answers it.

To assume any of the authors involved to be

"Christian" is to destroy the intricate balance of Kierkegaard's
authorship.

This also includes S^ren Kierkegaard himself (author

of the Edifying Discourses) at this stage in his life.

Kierkegaard

was presenting Christianity as he witnessed it in himself.

He was

convinced that when it came to Christianity, Christendom could do
nothing but remain silent.

His overall presentation of the re

ligious in its relation to Christianity was a gradual and serious
task.

One didn't just busy himself within Christ endom and then

pick up Christianity as one does a best-selling novel.
must see the religious for what it

First one

is, and then begin to see

what Christianity is in relation to a religious openness to the
infinite.

The entire task of seeing through the deceits of

Christendom was most difficult.

Kierkegaard's idea of one being-

a-Christian was filled with suffering, obedience and inwardness.
He had had moments of "indescrible joy" in his life as a Christian
before 1843 but he regarded a Christian life more as an eternal
and absolute duty than periodic flashes of salvation.
13 let no evil talk come out of your mouths, but only
such as is good for edifying, as fits the occasion, that it may
impart grace to those who hear,
Ech, 4 :29,
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The difference between Author A, Author B, Victor Eremita,
Constantine Constantius, Johannes de Silentio and S/ren Kierke
gaard is that in S^ren Kierkegaard's Edifying Discourses the
possibility of religion and Christianity is not viewed negatively
(in a b s e n t i a ) before it has been experienced.
continuously exalted.)

(In fact, it is

In the pseudonymous writings a personal

option for a religious comprehension of the personality is par
ticularly avoided.

The "religious"1^ is defined in the pseudony

mous literature, but usually in the second-hand vocabulary of the
interested non-believer.
Understanding the "religious" within Kierkegaard's collective
authorship demands an entente cordiale of the Edifying Discourses.
Whereas the pseudonymous writers neutralize the reader, S^ren
Kierkegaard edifies him.

A part-time Christian, a pagan, a roman

ticist, an Hegelian, a rationalist, an aesthetic and a judge
could read the pseudonymous works and, in sympathy with their
own various levels of interpretation, find therein a swarm of
momentary subjective satisfactions or discontentments.

In no

direct sense would one find there any expression of certitude or
faith.

The Edifying Discourses on the other hand are written in

light of the believer who begins with Divine Wisdom.
be no holding on to both at once.

There can

The pseudonymous literature

14 The meaning of the word "religious" has become so en
grossed in a vocabulary which invariably subjects the mystery
of Christianity to some system of explanation, be it reason,
feeling, or humanism, that people like Bonhoeffer have suggest
ed a religionless Christianity.
It is not Christianity's fault
that it lost the word "religion" rather man sacrificed it on the
human altar of subjectivism.
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11

is not completed by tne Barfyxng -Oiscoercss, '

lee kiarue-

guardian apologetic mas concerned with enabling the non--0hr
(or so-called Christian} so view both the pseudonymous enin
and the Edifying Discourses and to chocso one or the other.
The duplicity in the deeper sense, that is, in
the sense of the authorship as a whole, is not
at all what was a subject of comment in its tine,
viaa the contrast between the two parts of
Sither/Or. ho, the duplicity is discovered by
^
comparing Either/Or and the Two Edifying Discourses, °

15 The relationship of the Edifying hiscoursa3 10 The
pseudonymous literature is not a :brtnp'ihn}~hl
"■'h .;n::A;
■o

v e i n

02.

inv.it

0o s i/- vi,
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Chapter 2„ The Relation of the
Rseudorymous Literature to the
Edifying hiscerrses
Ko man can serve two masters; for either he will hate
the one and love the other or else he will stand by the
one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and
mammon,^
Volume 1 and Volume la of Either/Or
constitute a whole,
1
....

....

Repetition and Fear and Trembling tale up specific issues which
are introduced in Eithsr/Or cut left incomplete.

The secret of

both pseudonymous series however, can only ca understood in light
of the Edifying Discourses,

Left to themselves the pseudonymous

authors present "an indirect polemic against speculative philoso-t

C

phy which is indifferent to the existential." s

Kierkegaard was

aware that the world would grasp this relationship of the pseudo
nymous literature to the Edifying Discourses only with, great
difficulty:
I held out Either/Or to the world in my left hand,
and in my right the Two Edifying Discourses; but
all„ or as good as all, grasped with their right
hand what I held in my left.
To discover whether as writer behind the pseudonymous muses
17

Matt, 5s24

18

Either/Or3 Vol„ I, Translator's Preface, p, z,

19 Foinr of V iew, p, 20. The situation today would be some
what different in that much modern thee Lory is convinced than
there is no difference hew,"sen the right red left i.aoi and., if
right and the right left.
To do treadee w; all- ere would no a
forget these who come forth with no haul.
- two fig rue, wo;
orid tongue«
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Kierkegaard is captivated by the aesthetics!. the ethic-a!,

r

any other pseudonymous category is to begin at the wrong place.
Lowrie makes the observation;
If a reader should carelessly fail to observe that
Either/Or presents an either/or— either the aesthetic
o f the 'ethical life— and should happen to be unaware
that the author had already chosen decisively the
second alternative*..his praise of the book or his
condemnation would be alike futile.20
Victor Eremite is closer to Kierkegaard’s purpose when he men
tions that he had not yet been able to relinquish the idea that
one man could be the author of both parts and that he who says
A must also say B.

21

The decisive importance of Either/Or is revealed in the
distinction between the aesthetic and the ethical, and the im
possibility of mediating these two into a third category— the
religiousc

Repetition begins by attempting to solve the problem

of human freedom in relation to repetition.

It ends by discover

ing that the matter p r o perly belongs to the sphere of religion,,
All that Constantins can say is that he is unable to discuss the
problem at that level.

At least he admits a distinction between

experimental psychology and faith.

Johannes de Silentio in

Fear and Trembling also makes it clear that the fear and vrsrbling
of faith is something to which he is unable to assentc

Ho afrits

that it is more passionate than a dialectical lyric, tut poetry
20 Walter Lowrie,
1962), p. 252,
21

'

KierkssraardVolume I
i“

{'hv York.

Preface of Sither./Or, Vol., I, p. lj.
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is as far as he can gcu
Gradually the pseudonymous authors move from a position
indifferent to religion., to a position which, is recognised in
ins opposition to faith,.

Kierkegaard's apologetics does net

seek to have the pseudonymous authors Pslegianise their way into
Christianity as if such was possible.

Faith remains a gift, some

thing to be given and something to be willed.
attained from non-faithful considerations.

It will never be

The non-bs1iever mist

first admit of his ncn-belief (his despair).

As long as the

non-Christian member of Christendom fails to admit of his lack of
faith, he will never know "what God asks.”

He will only know de

spair, even though he will continually ask himself why his faith
is so uncertain, passionless, busy and unhappy.
The purpose of the pseudonymous authorship is to free Kier
kegaard, the man of faith, from the quasi-Christian ambiguities
of Christendom,

The concern of the pseudonymous personalities

is of importance to the man of faith only in so far as religion
stands apart as a testimony to their inadequacies.

The believer

deals with the world out of the strength of his faith.

He has

overcome the ambiguity of the pseudonymous neanderings by refus
ing to accept them to begin with.

The man of faith accepts the

world j not in the hope that it will give him faith, but in the
wisdom of God which has Itself made the world worthy of acceptance.
It is clear in the Edifying Discourses that all aesthetic utter
ances of man and all submissions to the dictates of ethics will

u::3 of one cloth, faith is something else.
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In Sierhkegaard?s authorship there is no attempt to m o l a r s
the Edifying Discourses and the pseudonymous vjriting.

The spclo

pe tics of Spren Kierkegaard does not continue where Author I? or
Aohannes de Silentio leave off.

Rather* in the Sdifylng Pis-

pourses S/ren Kierkegaard begins at a totally different starting
place.

The difference between the various pseudonymous investi

gations is relative * the difference between these and the religious
language of the Edifying Discourses is absolute,.
The awesoussise and complexity of the pseudonymous author
ship (especially Either/Or) makes a comparison with the Edifying
Discourses difficult.

Yet the very disproportion indicates the

simplicity of the religious as compared to the labyrinth of the
pseudonymous ambiguity.

To be a man of faith the intrigues of

modern philosophy are not necessary.

If faith demanded doubt as

a necessary prerequisite then faith is merely an adjunct to and
a product of a system of philosophy* and as such should find its
strength primarily in relation to this system.

Likewise* if faith

demanded this doubtful interpretation of faith* faith should be
abandoned or gone beyond, in favor of a more totally human inves
tigation of the aesthetiealf ethical and temporal nature of man.
To the writer c-f the Edifying Discourses any such idea of
going beyond faith* of living in a mere conducive time in rela
tion to faith, of being more psychologically at ease to receive
faith, of having the necessary good fortune to urd era tana, faith*
ci being more mature in regard to faith, or of being in relation
to Christ any different than those mho lived around Him, is
totally foreign.
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It is true that he who expects something in partic
ular, may be disappointed; but this does not happen
to the believer. When the world begins its sharp
testing, when the storms of life snap the vigorous
expectation of youth, when existence, which seems so
loving and so gentle, transforms itself into a mer
ciless proprietor who demands everything back,
everything which he gave so that he could take it
back; then the believer looks with sadness and pain
at himself and at life, but he still says:
"There
is an expectation which all the world can not take
from me; it is the expectation of faith, and this is
victory.
I am not deceived; for what the world seemed
to promise me, that promise I still did not believe that
it would keep; my expectation was not in the world,
but in G od.22
When doubt begins to fill the modern

soul, it is not simply me

diated into a higher state by Srfren Kierkegaard, rather it is
completely overturned by being shown in relation to faith.

Doubt

in the Edifying Discourses is seen as despair and not as a neces
sary increment to faith.
Then you humbly acknowledged before God that God
tempts no man, but that everyone is tempted when
he is seduced and drawn away by his own desires,
Just as you were tempted by proud and arrogant
and defiant thoughts...
Then you acknowledged, humble and ashamed, that it
was well that you, in your despair, should not have
found an explanation of life's dark saying which
anyone would be able to insist upon.23
In the third Edifying Discourse entitled "Love covers a
multitude of sins"

S^ren Kierkegaard makes it clear that it is

one thing to start with "love covers a multitude of sins" and
another to start with'bin

discovers a multitude of sins."

One

22 Sdren Kierkegaard, Edifying Discourses, Volume I, Trans
lated by David P. Swenson and Lillian iviarvin Swenson (Minneapolis,
1962), p. 43,
23

Ibid.. p. 59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

begins with sir. cr with faithful levs™
e un

ran. into love.,

Ileus is ae

A parson con snort vith doubt cr ''buy b e ;

r.c ;~::'Dirz:..v of denoting will give c m

faith.

It is net r.::til cue

m vysuiees she futility of doubtful investigations tint us sou.
rill to believe.

He

entire display cf the pseudonymous meander-

fugs cannot make sense of the Edifying Discourses., Batherr iris
concern of Sfrsn Kierkegaard is for the believer.

Every Inman

irvostigation is bondage until it is overcome faithfully in tbs
lore of doc.c

Once this love has conquered, man can return to

durum activityf but not as a hunianisf? psychologist, philosopher
0-1

css theologian^ but as a Christian.

Siren Kierkegaard has cveroonie

she world in faith and returned to it with G o d ’s help,

for the

author of the Edifying Discourses man is not alone, but God 1s
—

^

-

--- —

- mi—

-II

--

4-

with the man viio again accepts the world,:
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Chapter 3-

The Edifying

But he who does the truth comes to the light that
his deeds may he made manifest, for they have been
performed in God.25
With the words of a Jutland pastor, "For only the truth
p/T

which edifies is truth for you,"

Either/Or closes.

is left wondering, "what is the truth which edifies?"

The reader
It is ap

parent that neither Author A nor Author B are capable of import
ing to the reader anything concerning the truth which edifies.
It is not until the reader takes notice of the Edifying Discourses
that he or she is able to meet the truth which edifies.
To begin with Kierkegaard chooses the word "edifying" as a
calculated assault on Hegelian philosophy.
It is curious what a hate Hegel has for the edifying
as is everywhere apparent.
The edifying is not an
opiate that lulls to sleep, however, it is the finite
spirit's Amen and one side of knowledge that ought not
be overlooked.28
Instead of the edifying, Hegel chose to endorse the concept of
25

John 3s21

26 S/ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Volume II, Translated
by Walter Lowrie with revisions and a forward by Howard A.
Johnson (Garden City, 1959), p. 356.
27 Throughout the entire stage of his aesthetic writing
Kierkegaard accompanied every pseudonymous work with an Edifying
Discourse. According to Kierkegaard's own count there were
eighteen Discourses published along with the several pseudonymous
works.
28 So'ren Kierkegaard, Johannes Olimacus or, De Omnibus
Dubitandum Est and A Sermon, translated with, an assessment by
T. H. Crcxail, D, S.
(Stanford, 1967), p .97.
22
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27

23

mediation.

Mediation in Kierkegaard's mind was simply a process

proper to a system of logic.

It is important to distinguish here

between the ironic beginnings (absolute negativity) of Socratic
philosophy and the "nothingness" with which Hegelian philosophy
began.

29
Whereas the absolute nothingness of Socrates ^ was not

closed to the possibility of edifying, the nothingness of Hegel
was simply the uncriticized foundation for more and more media
tions.

As usual, Kierkegaard finds Hegelian assumptions arrested

at the hands of Socratic irony.
Kierkegaard says of mediation:

"Give that up, and there is

no speculation; if you admit it there is no absolute choice, no
either/or.
The matter can be summarized in this fashion:

Hegelian

mediation is destroyed by a serious regard for "either/or."
That is, Socratic irony is quite capable of letting the media
tion of the System expose itself to self-destruction.

But then

man is left with the question, how can one come to grips with the
religious category if he remains ambiguously in the category of
either/or?

Can a man who has become an either/or get beyond the

absolute negative of Socrates?

Kierkegaard believes he can.

It

is not however as if a man goes from mediation to either/or and
29 In so far as he (Socrates) emancipates mankind from
the fear of death, he gives them in exchange the anxious repre
sentation of an inevitable something of which one knows nothing.
Accordingly, one must be accustomed to being edified by the
reassurance residing in nothingness in order to find repose
in this. Spren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, translated
with an Introduction and Notes by Lee M, Caoel (Bloomington, 1968),
p. 118.
3°

Either/Cr, Vol. II, 0. 177.
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24

then on to edification.

Mediation is reality regarded as thought.

"Either/or” is reality as it finds itself to be, but in relation
ship to the absolute negative.

Edification is reality as it

finds itself to be, but now regarded as something g i v e n . ^

There

does exist a relationship between the eternal witnessed by its
absence and natural religion.

There is no relation, however, be

tween mediation and either/or, between mediation and edifying,
or between existence regarded as doubtful and existence regarded
as wonder.
Whereas Kierkegaard*s use of either/or points out what is
not religious and not open to the infinite, his use of the edify
ing witnesses the possibility of the religious or better, wit
nesses the reality of natural religion.
The fact that modern man has lost sight of this situation
and taken under his own supervision what previously has been
•given' by God under the name of natural religion, has led man
to mediate and mediate and mediate unto the point where no one
can understand another unless he too agrees to undertake the
same systematic mediation.

The problem always remains the same.

Prom where does one begin to mediate and when can one stop?
Hence, in our age as the order of the day we have
the disgusting sight of young men who are able to
mediate Christianity and paganism, are able to play
with the titanic forces of history, and are unable
to tell a plain man what he has to do in life, and

31 In the words of John the Baptist, "Ho one can receive
anything unless it is given to him from heaven." John 3:27
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who do not know any better what they themselves
have to do.32
The edifying also has the ability to come to grips with
the future, something which mediation can do only by recalling
the past.
Philosophy turns towards the past, towards the
whole enacted history of the world, it shows how
the discrete factors are fused in a higher -unity,
it mediates and mediates.33
For the future can be overcome only through eternity.

And con

cern with the eternal is the precise interest of the edifying.
Edifying, like every word signed S^ren Kierkegaard, finds its
beginning in the religious category of Faith.

The hope of

S^ren Kierkegaard is that the Edifying Discourses will finally
meet
that individual whom with joy and gratitude I call
my reader, that individual whom it seeks, toward
whom, as it were, it stretches out its arms; that
individual who is benevolent enough to let himself
be found, benevolent enough to receive it, whether
in the moment of meeting it found him happy and
confident, or melancholy and thoughtful.
The Edifying Discourses were written for the believer.
"Edifying" is a positive religious category.

It is not the

logically necessary category of Hegelian mediation.

If it wer

32 Either/Or, Vol. II, p. 175. These are the words of
Author B, though not edifying, they at least call a spade a
spade. It seems much of contemporary theology likes to call a
spade a heart when actually it only considers "clubs."
33

Ibid. , p. 174.

34

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, Preface, p. 21.
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included within the Hegelian framework it could not edify in
any sense, but simply keep one busy.

Related to mediation,

edification would become more like the word superego, and as
such it would be strictly a hypothetical construct with which
one must work to carry on the business of finding another and
possibly a more inclusive hypothetical construct.

For S^ren

Kierkegaard, only concerns of faith edify.
Edification, moreover, was not a negative religious cate
gory.

Although concern for the infinite (or religion) within

the language of Socratic irony was not absent, it was negative.
That is, it was witnessed only in its absence, much like the
absent God of Bergman's movies.

Religion taken in this sense

was the concern of the pseudonymous authors and not that of
Sj2(ren Kierkegaard.

Whereas S^ren Kierkegaard edified in his

discourses, the pseudonymous writers could at best point out
that such edification was possible, but it was not the concern
of non-believers such as Johannes de Silentio to deal with it
positively.
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Part II

Some Specific Aesthetic Insights
Relating to Time, Place and State of Be-ing
Chapter i.

The Moment and the Instant

We shall all indeed rise, hut we shall not all be
changed— in a momen^, in the twinkling of an eye,
at the last trumpet.
The initial context of the moment is taken from the Greek
notion of "the sudden" (t o $$rziQ*,'is)a.& found in Plato's Parmenp
ides.
This notion of the moment is especially clear in Magister
Kierkegaard's MA Thesis, The Concept of Irony.
Its (irony's) relation to the world is not such that
this relation is a moment in the content of person
ality.
Its relation to the world is never at any moment
to be in relation to the world, its relation is such that
at the moment this is about to commence, it draws itself
back with a sceptical closedness.
(£r'o.i'i) But this re
serve is the reflex of personality into itself that is
clearly abstract and void of content.
The ironical person
ality is therefore merely the outline of a personality. Hence
1

I Cor. 15:52.

2 The word 'instant' appears to mean something such that
from it a thing passes to one or other of the two conditions.
There is no transition from a state of rest so long as the thing
is still at rest, nor from motion so long as it is still in motion,
but this queer thing, the instant, is situated between the motion
and the rest; it occupies no time at all, and the transition of
the moving thing to the state of rest, or of the stationary thing
of being in motion, takes place In and from the instant.
Accord
ingly* Ike one, since it both is at rest and is in motion, must
pass from the one condition to the other— only so can it do both
things— and when it passes, it makes the transition instantaneously
it occupies no time in making it and at that moment it, cannot be
either in motion or at rest.
(The Collected Dialogues of Plato,
edited by Edith. Hamilton and Huntington Cairns ;liew York, lyt-1 j,
p. 947.)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

one sees that there is an absolute dissimilarity between
Socrates and Christ; for in Christ dwelt the immediate
fullness ox the godhead* and his relation to the world
is an absolutely real relationship, so that the Church
is conscious of itself as the members of its b o d y , 3
This Socratic concept of the moment is then related to Hegel's
mediated use of the moment.

The outcome of this relationship be

tween the dialectical moment of Hegel and the ironic moment of
Socrates is expressed in the words of Author A:
There are many who think that they live thus, because
after having done the one or the other, they combine or
mediate the opposites.
But this is misunderstanding;
for the true eternity does not lie behind either/or,
but before it. Hence, their eternity will be a painful
succession of temporal moments, for they will be con
sumed by a twofold regret.
The negative moment of Socrates is far more hopeful than Hegel's
mediated use of the term.

It becomes obvious that in the mouth

of Author A the prodigiously interesting moment as understood
by Hegel is left to a dialectical self-destruction.

When fin5
ished with some of the dialectic intrigues of Author A the reader
.

would be glad to go back to the "outline of a personality" of
fered by Socrates rather than stay suspended within the despair
ing grasp of mediation.^
3

Concept of Irony, p. 242.(This work was completed Sept. 16,

4

Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 38.

1841)

5 Hang yourself, you will regret it; do not hang yourself,
and you will also regret that; hang yourself or do not hang your
self, you will regret both; whether you hang yourself or do not
hang yourself, you will regret both. This gentlemen, is the sum
and substance of all philosophy.
(Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 37.)
6 Mediation as such is not opposed to Christianity, in fact
it is frequently found in Scripture:
But as it is, Christ has obtained a ministry which
is as much more excellent than the old as the covenant
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Once the ironic use of the moment begins to develop in
Kierkegaard's authorship the interest of the concept switches
from a relation to either/or and takes up residence mainly with
in the more developed concepts of repetition and fear and trem
bling,^

In this later development the moment acquires a more
Q
important meaning,
so much so in fact that there is a noticeable
change found in Kierkegaard's vocabulary (especially the pseudony
mous literature) from the term "moment" to the word "instant."
The moment however, is not absent from the Edifying Discourses
and is as forcefully present in the fifth as in the first.
The relationship of the moment to the Infinite and how the
q
new term repetition goes beyond the finite shrewdness of medi
ation and the negativity of either/or makes it clear that either
a new meaning must be given to "the moment" or a new word must
be chosen to replace it.

Wishing not to destroy the time-bound

implications of "the moment" Kierkegaard willed to initiate a
new word, "the instant."
6 cont.
he mediates is better, since it is enacted on better
promises. (Heb. 8:6)
The distinction is based not on the rejection of a word, but on
the interpretation of its meaning.
In the Letter to the Hebrews
mediation draws its strength from the promise of God. Where does
Hegelian mediation draw its strength?
7 Here dread could also be mentioned but a more particular
interest in this term does not come -until Kierkegaard's pseudony
mous muse Vigilius Haufniensis writes a book by that name in 1844
8 Just as, in a way, one could say that the New Testament
is more important than the Old Testament.
9

See Part III, Chapter 2.
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Croxall defines the two Danish words as:
Moment means the temporal passing moment, in which
the aesthetic as such (in his selfishness) lives.
0iblik means the decisive instant (an atom of eternity)
when Eternity impinges upon Time and makes its eternal
demands upon u s — demands of duty and surrender.10
As Kierkegaard's authorship grew and the pseudonymous in
vestigations began to take up the religious problem in greater
detail

(even though as un-believing observers) a more specifi

cally religious vocabulary was needed.

In Authors A and B,

mention of religion was usually nebulously similar to the ethical
or referred to in a distinctly other-person sort of way as if
religion had an impact on culture but was now a thing of the
past.

The pressing task of the pseudonymous muse was to get on

with the aesthetical preoccupations.

The one outstanding ex

ception in Either/Or falls at the end of Vol. II where a sermon
of a Jutland pastor is recorded by Author B so that Author A
could read it and think of himself.

It was entitled:

"The Ed

ification Implied In the Thought that as Against God We Are
Always in the Wrong."

In its very organization and style a

similarity to the Edifying Discourses can be discerned.
words as:

Such

the wish, the future, doubt, the instant, duty and

inward point out a close affinity between it and the Edifying
Discourses.

The sermon ends with these words, "for only the

truth which edifies is truth for you."

It seems that for the

sake of those not yet convinced of his purpose Kierkegaard left
one final calling card.
10
p. 28.

T. H. Croxall, Kierkegaard Studies (lew York, 1967),
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Returning to an investigation of the concept of the moment,
it like the occasion,

11

receives its more prodigiously interest

ing definition at the hands of the pseudonymous muses.

Whereas

its religious understanding is found in the entirely different
domain of the Edifying Discourses, that niche where S,^ren Kier
kegaard avoids the poetic coteries of the pseudonymous flaneurs
"by beginning with the "expectation of faith!"
...for if there were no future (expectation of faith),
neither would there have been a past, and if there
were neither past nor future, then would man be en
slaved like the beasts, his head bent toward the earth,
his s o u l ensnared in the service of the m o m e n t , "*2
Man determined within the category of the moment is no dif
ferent than the animal, except that man is able to create a
system which adroitly orders these moments as if they were com
plete in themselves.

(That is, subjected to the category of the

moment man begins to think that he can construct existence.)
Wouldn't it be momentarily satisfying in solving life's problem
if one could simply wish his consciousness to vanish and then
study himself as a non-rational animal?

The author of the

Edifying Discourses regards momentary satisfaction as a shrewd
form of despair.
In Authors A and B the moment is concerned with the finite
exhaustion of reality under the sole category of time.
finitely every moment is its own limit.
of moments except

in the mind of man.

Taken

There is to be no unity
Author A however, makes

11

See Part

II, Chapter 3.

12

Edifying

Discourses,Vol. I, p. 34.
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some sense of the moment when he related it to the sensual
erotic which finds its true home in the musical.
Only in this manner (Mozarts’ Don Juan) can Don Juan
become epic, in that he constantly finishes, and
constantly begins again from the beginning, for his
life is the sum of repellent moments which have no
coherence, his life as moment is the sum of moments,
as the sum of moments is the moment.^3
Residing in this unreflective category of immediacy the moment
is freed from the linguistic mediation of Hegel.

Such a relation

of the moment to immediacy, however, seems to self-destruct as
soon as it is b o m .

As soon as it becomes something in relation

to anything else it no longer has immediacy as its nature.
as

Thus

soon as the immediate sensuous erotic, defined musically, is

grasped, it is gone.

One is left wondering if it would bepos

sible to live existentially in the immediate sensuous erotic
which sounds so passionately throughout Mozart's Don Juan?

Yet

it seems that even though immediate existence is closer to the
passion of fear and trembling found in Constantius' Knight of
Paith than the reflective relationship of Author B's ethical
personality to the universal, immediate existence is still not
the life of faith.

Just as Author B attempts to set the occasion

straight for Author A by ushering in the universal "calling,"
present to all men, Author B attempts to destroy the power of
the immediate by ordering life in accord with the universality
of duty.
13

In either case the understanding of man is ordered up
Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 95.
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solely in terms of the finite.
of the immediate.
sal.

Author A chooses the garment

Author B chooses the garment of the univer

And again the words of editor Victor Eremita come to mind,

"that he who says A must also say B",1 ^
Most men in our age find themselves in

the anxiousposition

of regarding the moment in its completely finite character as
somehow Infinite.
by moment to be of

They wish to find this life as lived moment
eternal significance in their own terms re

gardless of any God. Eternity or Infinitude.

By a sleight of

their own hand men find themselves in the embarrassingly shallow
position of wishing the finite to be Infinite.
phosis demands more than man's wish!

15

Man

the present moment and not willing to admit

Such a metamor-

has become lost in
his mistake, he has

hoped to overcome the confusion by making the resulting confusion
itself God.
Without knowing how it comes about, they are in the
midst of the life movement, a link in the chain which
connects a future with a past. Unconcerned about how
14

Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 13.

15 The writer of the Edifying Discourses treats the wish
differently;
'I. .that is the way a man should speak; for the wish
profits nothing." Then would he quietly review his
inner emotions; and every time his soul allowed it
self to rest on a wish, he called it to him and said:
"You know you must not wish"; and in so doing he made
progress. When his soul became fearful he called it
to him and said:
"If you are anxious, it is because
you are wishing; for fear is a form of wishing, and
you know you must not wish"— and so he went on.
(Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 28.)
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it happeuqd they are borne along on the wave of the
present.,b
Whether the moment finds man in pleasure for-a-time, or whether
*7
it finds man shrewdly satisfied with a "rotation method"1 of
cautiously arranged moments, all of this does not concern the
author of the Edifying Discourses.
How could one who steers toward perfection under the
full sail of hope, have many moments to spend on
merely human possibilities?
Any contact with Pelegian diminutives was avoided by Spfren Kier
kegaard as a temptation which reduced man-the-individual to the
momentary, curious and freedom-less category of the mob.

If

freedom is to exist in man, how is man to stand in relation to
the moment?

Is human activity simply a necessary succession of

moments in which freedom is lost, determined in its relation to
the past?

Is human activity free only in the immediacy of the

present, thus making any connection with the past or future im
possible, and therefore, condemning man like a non-rational
animal to the present moment?

Or is human activity to seek its

freedom in relation to the future, in its hope and universality,
thereby condemning man to a hope which as such does not exist
except in relation to that which is not?
Freedom as found in the Edifying Discourses escapes these
never-ending questions by beginning in an entirely different
16

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p, 46.

17

Chapter Eight of Either/Or, Vol. I.
Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 89,
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place.

For man to be free be must define his personality in

relation to the Infinite.
bring this about.

No series of finite mediations will

Again the secret of S/ren Kierkegaard’s

Edifying Discourses lies in his starting point.
no question of mediating our way to the Infinite.

There can be
The reader

cannot be forced to choose, but can only be shown the difference
between beginning with worldly desires, pleasure, and despair
and beginning with the Infinite where is found the expectation
of faith, the giver of every good and every perfect gift; the
one who covers a multitude of sins; and the one who strengthens
in the inner man.
Only he who abandoned his soul to worldly desires, he
who chose the glamorous thraldom of pleasure and was
not able to free himself from its thoughtless or mel
ancholy fear, only he is content to let creation bear
witness so that he can shrewdly and cleverly use it in
the service of the moment. y
In the fifth Edifying Discourse S^ren Kierkegaard compares
the moment to the eternal which is truly the concern of the
moment.
Through every deeper reflection, which makes a man
older than the moment, and lets him grasp the eternal,
he assures himself that he has an actual relation to
the world, and that consequently this relationship
cannot consist merely in a knowledge about this world
and about himself as a part of it, since such a know
ledge is not a relationship, precisely because in this
knowledge he himself is indifferent to this world, and
this world is indifferent to his knowledge about it.
Not until concern awakens in his soul as to what the
world signifies to him and he to the world, what every
thing in him through which he belongs to the world,
signifies to him, and he through it to the world, in
that moment does the inner man proclaim itself in this
concern.20
19

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 109.

20

Ibid., pp. no-111.
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Thus as man "becomes "older than the moment" he "begins to define
himself in relation to the Sternal in such a way that the ataraxy
of the moment gives way to the passion of faith.

The moment no

longer is a temporal category, it is ablaze in the passionate
conflict that finds the finite face to face with the Infinite.
The moment has vanished, the instant is b o m !

The possibility

of the instant, however, does not destroy the moment but only
sets the human personality in relation to freedom.
moment the temporality of despair can return.

At any

Repetition of

the momentary life is possible but it is not the occasion of
human freedom.

Rather, it is a return to the despair of deter

minism in the past.

With repetition of the instant, however,

man has willed to receive the gift of the Infinite and as such
is not determined in the past, present, or future, but has over
come time and made it his servant by repeating the Eternal.
In Fear and Trembling the Knight of Infinite Resignation
takes the moment as far as it can go by totally renouncing the
world.

He stands on the threshold of the instant.

Knight of Faith can put the instant to use.

Only the

By the teleological

suspension of the ethical, Abraham (as a Knight of Faith) re
jects both the immediate and the universal categories of the
moment and takes the absurd step in faith.

The very absurdity

(non-understandability) of the choice indicates its
parture from the moment.

total de

As Abraham witnessed the absolute call

of God he was defined in relation to the instant.

Every category

of time was overcome, the instant was born and Abraham stood
individual, alone, and absurd (in the temporal eyes of man)
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before God.
Johannes de Silentio though himself unable to make the
movement of faith— to realize the instant — presents faith with
an integrity which at least gives faith its proper place and
does not define it in Hegelian categories.
In our time nobody is content to stop with faith
but wants to go further.
It would perhaps be rash
to ask where these people are going, but it is
surely a sign of breeding and culture for me to as
sume that everybody has faith, for otherwise it.
would be queer for them to be...going further.
It is supposed to be difficult to understand Hegel,
but to understand Abraham is a trifle.22
With the use of the instant the pseudonymous writers,
Constantine and Johannes, one delivering an essay in experimen
tal

psychology and the other a dialectical lyric, are proclaim

ing

the necessary independence of the religious from

chological and the poetic.

the psy

The once-removed discussion of the

religious faith by the pseudonymous muses gradually makes it
clear that any relation of the religious with the aesthetical
must be carried out in terms of the religious and not vice
versa.

Any mediation of this distinction immediately offers

religion up to the system of Hegelian philosophy.
The instant then destroys mediation's hold on religion as
a premise contained solely in the natural order.

And, on the

other hand, it dispels the ironic relationship of the moment

21

Fear and Trembling, p. 23.

22

Ibid., p. 43.
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to absolute negativity by establishing it in relation to the
positive principle of the Infinite. Yftiereas Socratic ignorance
2~<
is founded in Infinite resignation J the faith of Abraham re
quires everything anew in terms of the absurd which puts Abraham
in an absolute relation to the absolute.

23

Fear and Trembling, p. 79.

24

Ibid., p. 72.

24
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Chapter 2.

The Occasion

So if thy right eye is an occasion of sin to thee,
pluck it out and cast it from thee.,.25
The first Edifying Discourse is entitled "The Expectation
of Faith.'

It is written as a commentary on Gal. 3:28-29 to

be delivered on New Year's Day.

For S^ren Kierkegaard the pro

per use of the term occasion receives its direction from the
words of St. Paul:
There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is
neither slave nor free, there is neither
male nor fema^g; for you are all one in
Christ Jesus.
The celebration of aesthetical and ethical occasions have been
radically reversed.

No longer does the cultural, social or

sexual occasion primarily determine man's existence.

Faith in

Christ Jesus now becomes the starting point within which man
is to understand the occasion,

27

'

The myth used by man to explain life does not determine
pQ
man's faith.
Rather the faith of man in God determines the
25 Matt. 5:29.
26 Gal. 3:28.
27 For I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels,
nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor
powers, nor height, nor depth, nor anything else in all creation,
will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus
our Lord. Rom, 8:38-39.
28 ...remain at Ephesus that you may charge certain persons
not to teach any different doctrine, nor to occupy themselves wit
myths and endless genealogies which promote speculations rather
than the divine training that is in faith.
I Tim. 1:3-4.
39
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"myth" wherein man conceptualises his thanksgiving.
demytholo gizing

Bultman's

of scripture is "new" not because he is

operating like the writers of the scriptures who seek to con
ceptualize through faith,

(to that extent all scripture is

demytholo gizing in that it attempts to destroy all myths not
founded in the belief of Jesus Christ) but because he finds
an understanding of these myths outside a relationship to that
same faith in God present to the writers of the sacred books.
From what occasion does Bulhnann draw his vision?
The principal investigation of the occasion found in the
pseudonymous authorship falls in the aesthetical half of
Either/Or.
Occasion is thus of the greatest importance in re
gard to every production; indeed, it is this which
essentially decides the question regarding its true
aesthetic value.29
The aestheticist who adopts aesthetics as his pro
fession, and in his profession sees the real oc
casion is eo ipso lost. This is by no means to say
that he cannot perform his work skillfully; but the
secret of all production he has not understood. He
is too much a Pelagian autocrat to be able, in child
ish wonder, to rejoice over the curious fact that it
is as if alien powers had produced that which a
human being believes is his own:
the inspiration,
namely, and the occasion.30
One personification of this Pelagian autocrat is found later
in Fear and Trembling where a parson is presented who is "de
lighted with himself" and "at the earnest wrath which thundered
29

Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 234.

30

ibid., p. 235,
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down'1 his personal oratory concerning Abraham of the Old
Testament.
He said to himself and to his wife, "I am an
orator. What I lacked was the occasion. When
I talked about Abraham on Sunday I did not feel
moved in the least^31
Johannes de Silentio the author of Fear and Trembling though
unwilling to become a Knight of Faith himself is pointing
out the weakness of any so-called faith which of itself is
dependent upon the occasion regarded as a lyric enhancement
of words.

The parson had confused the occasion with faith.

In the old days they said, "What a pity things
don’t go on in the world as the parson preaches"—
perhaps the time is coming, especially with the
help of philosophy, when they will say, "For
tunately things don't go on as the parson preaches;
for after all there is some sense in life, but
none at all in his p r e a c h i n g . "32
Author A continues to discuss the occasion making it clear
that left exhausted in the hands of the finite the occasion
can do nothing but self-destruct.
The occasion is a category of the finite, and it
is impossible for immanent thinking to lay hold
of it; for that it is too paradoxical.
This can
also be seen from the fact that that which comes
out of the occasion is something quite different
from the occasion itself, which is an absurdity
for all immanent thought.33
The occasion is, then, in itself nothing, and
only something in relation to that which it
gives rise to, and in relation to this it is
31

Fear and Trembling, p. 40.

32

Ibid.

33

Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 236.
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exactly nothing.
For as soon as the occasion
becomes something other than nothing, then
it would stand in relatively immanent re
lation to that which it produces, and would
then be either ground or cause. Unless one
holds on to this firmly, everything again
becomes confused.34
For Author A the occasion reduced to its simplest expression
cannot be self explanatory.

In the last quote listed above

the Hegelian categories of position, negation and mediation
are used to cloth the occasion as it is offered up to the
ready sword of Socratic irony.
To add a final touch to the ambiguity of Author A's dis
course on the occasion he concludes:
What then is said here must be regarded as un
necessary, like a superfluous title page which
is not included when the work is b o u n d . 5
In addition to the parson found in Fear and Trembling,
the "Seducer" who records his "Diary" in the last section of
Either/Or1s aesthetical volume presents a classic study in
the aesthetical manipulations of the occasion.

The charm, wit,

passion, insight, and endurance of the "Seducer" used to control
the occasion is both finitely engrossing (so often found in
discriminately endorsed in today's Playboy ethic) and immediate
ly self-consuming.
In the first instance the point was that he
(the Seducer) enjoyed egoistically and per
sonally what in part was reality rs gift to him
and in part was that with which he himself had
34

Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 236.

35

Ibid,, p. 236.
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impregnated reality; in the second instance
his personality was effaced, and he enjoyed
this situation, and himself in the situation.
In the first instance he constantly needed
reality as occasion, as factor; in the poetic...
Thus the poetic was constantly present^in the
ambiguity in which he passed his life.-3
With these words, the life of the "Seducer" catches the eye
as a restless movement between the scientific empiricist and
the poet.

The occasion has reality both in being-what-it-is

and in being-what-it-is-considered-to-be.
both of these at once.

Somehow it must be

This re-occuring theme of dialectical

ambivilance initally and finally mitigates the character of
the "Seducer" to a personality of hopeless despair.
For Author A the occasion is seen both in its immediacy,
as was the senuous fruitlessness of Mozart's Don Juan and in
its capacity of being controlled as is brought out in the
Seducers shrewd use of the moment.

How can one keep the im

mediacy of the occasion and yet shrewdly adjust it to ones
own wish?
Author B has some reassuring advice for the aesthetic
"Seducer."

Whereas the "Seducer" must always be subject to the

whimsical immediacy of yet another occasion, the ethical man
has a calling.
In the first place a calling explains talent
not as something accidental in existence but
as the universal; in the second place, it ex
hibits the universal in its true beauty.
For
talent is beautiful only when it is transfigured
as a call, ana existence is beautiful only when
everyone has a call... When a man has a calling
he generally has a norm outside himself which,
36

Either/Or, Vol. I, pp. 301-302.
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without making him a slave, does nevertheless
prescribe in a measure what he must do, ap
portions for him the time, often gives him
occasion to begin. If for once he does not
make a success of his business, he hopes to
do it better next time, and this next time
is not too far distant.8'
For

the ethical author the immediacy of existence aswitnes

sed

by Author A can only be put-a-right in termsof the

versal.

uni

This reveals two new problems to be taken up in

Repetition and Fear and Trembling.

If the universal is the

savior of the aesthetic after all, "how is man to be free in
relation to the universal?"

(Why is m a n ’s freedom not lost

in being determined

in relation to the universal?) Andsecond

ly, if, in relation

to the universal is to be the proper way to

conceive of human activity how is one to regard the religious
personality?^
Thus the occasion served a double purpose in the pseudony
mous literature.

It was initially used in the mouth of Author

A to point out the inevitable self destruction of any under
standing of life based on the experience of an immediate re
lationship to the finite.

And on the other hand it forced the

ethical author to confirm its

relationship to the universal.

It is precisely at that point when the ethical is seen as re
lated to the universal that the ethical is seen in its
tion to the religious.
37

opposi

In fact, a dialectic lyric explicating

Either/Or, Vol. II, p. 298.

38 In the case of Abraham’s personality, according to
Johannes de Silentio, one encounters the teleological suspen
sion of the (universal) ethical.
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the decisive difference between ethics and religion is the
point of Johannes de Silentio's authorship of Fear and
Trembling.
How then does S/ren Kierkegaard religiously answer the
problems investigated by the pseudonymous authors?

In light

of his ironic style of apologetics SjzCren Kierkegaard is not
going to attempt an answer in terms of the pseudonymous ques
tioners!

Beginning at the wrong place in apologetics would make

religious offerings appear exhaustively human.

■jq

The pseudony

mous authors could argue with great diversity up to the thresh
old of the religious but further than that they could not go.
If it were possible to argue one into the sphere of religion,
then religion would be just another aesthetic category.

To

break the hold of the never-ending aesthetical questions, (the
state of being an either/or) S^ren Kierkegaard sets the case
of the religious in an entirely different discourse than is found
in

the

pseudonymous literature.

Without authority, Sjzfren

Kierkegaard chooses to edify the reader.

The finite perplex

ities of Hegelian mediation could not be overcome from within
the sphere of their own systematizing.

Kierkegaard as thinker

was convinced that he could not answer an improper question by
accepting accidentally the premises of the questioner.

With

the publishing of the Edifying Discourses the infatuation with
39 From now on, therefore, we regard no one from a human
point of view; even though we once regarded Christ from a
human point of view, we regard him thus no longer.
2 Cor. 5:16.
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46

mediation was not questioned, rather it was radically denied
as the necessary starting point.

Religion as present in tra

ditional Christianity and in Hegelian philosophy could not be
mutually agreeable bed partners.
one or the other!

For Kierkegaard it was simply

If a person is to 'allow philosophy to control

religion then why not take the philosophy (as did Feuerbach,
Nietzsche, and Marx) and do away with the accidential appendage
called religion?

Thus, to quote the pseudonymous muses as if

they were speaking in the same way as S^ren Kierkegaard in the
Edifying Discourses is to reduce the difference between the
vocabulary of a believer and a non-believer to something ac
cidential.

If the task of religious apologetics is to distin

guish between accidentally diverse disciplines, Christ is
seen, not as the Son of C-od, but as Just another teacher among
men.

Surely there lived and will always live men who are con

sidered better at distinguishing between disciplines than was
Christ.

Just as there will be in the world's terms better

historians, sociologists, psychologists, preachers, ministers
and humanitarians than Christ.
In Author A ’s discussion of the occasion he praises it
as:

"Essentially deciding the question regarding every proA C'

duction's true aesthetic value."'

The author of the Edifying

Discourses finds existence to be Just the opposite.

For him

aesthetic value depends upon a person's willing to believe (Faith):
Whether his forehead was flattened almost like
a beast's or arched more proudly than the heavens;
40

See page 40, footnote #29.
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whether his arm was outstretched, to rule over king
doms and countries, or to gather up the necessary
gifts which fell from the rich man's table; whether
his gesture was obeyed by thousands, or there was
not a soul who paid attention to him; whether elo
quence blossomed on his lips or only unintelligible
sounds passed over them; whether he was the power
ful man who defied the storm, or the defenceless
woman who only sought shelter against the storm—
it has nothing to do with the matter, my hearer,
absolutely nothing.41
For S/^ren Kierkegaard there is a real need for the occasion,
but of itself the occasion does not create this need.

The

immediate occasion as reflected throughout the writing of
Author A is determinate in so
is

far as an activity accomplished

exhausted by the immediacy of finitude.

The author of the

Edifying Discourses discovers the significance of the occasion
only when viewed in relation to the Infinite.
My soul is not insensible to the joy or pain of
the individual, but, God be praised, it is not
thus that the individual can prove or disprove
the expectation of faith.
God be praised!
Nor
can time prove it or disprove it; for faith ex
pects an eternity.42
In the second Edifying Discourse entitled "Every Good and Every
Perfect Gift is from Above" S^ren Kierkegaard uses St. Paul's
words to closely distinguish the religious from the aesthetic.
The apostle Paul says:
"All of God's creation
is good if it is received with thankfulness."
It is principally in order to warn against an
earthly prudence which would enslave the believer
in the service of ceremonial (the occasion) that

41

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, pp. 29-30.

42

Ibid., p. 48.
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the apostle says these w o r d s . ^
To begin with an exhaustively human understanding of the oc
casion is the enduring tendency of the aesthetic personality.
Yet, cannot the initial assumptions of the aesthetic also come
under examination?

It seems to be a habit with the pseudonymous

muses to question all but their own presuppositions.
The author of the Edifying Discourses points out that if
the words of James:

"every good gift and every perfect gift

if from above" are to have meaning then the reader must be
aware that faith is not determined by man's own understanding
of the occasion of faith itself, but rather by God in whom there
is "no variableness neither shadow of turning."
Whereas the occasion is used in one way by Author A and
in another by Author B, S^ren Kierkegaard escapes any ambiguity
in expressing the occasion by casting it that meaning witnes
sed by the apostolic words:

"Love

The multiplicity and cleverness of

covers a multitude of

sins."

reason to shadow theone

religious understanding of the occasion finds expression in
the third Edifying Discourse:
Thus is it not true that the guilty may be the
occasion for the destruction of the innocent?
But is not the opposite equally, true? Perhaps then
the understanding lacked only the courage to be
lieve this, and while it had sufficient distressing
cleverness to discover the wretchedness of life, it
did not have the courage to apprehend the power of
love. Is this not true? For the reason still
merely makes a man despondent and faint-hearted,
but love gives courage freely, and because of this

43

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 63.
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every apostolic word is always confident. ''
This passage attempts much.

It denies to the rational begin

nings of Hegelian and Kantian philosophy an opening to explain
life as expressed in an apostolic word.

It posits love as a

power not totally determined by man's own effort, thus estab
lishing the understanding of love not in the "overman" of
Neitzsche but in the confident framework of an apostolic ut
terance.

It abandons all Pelegian efforts, not into the business

of corrective doubt but into the despairing guise of despondency
and faint-heartedness.

The reality of both the infinite and

the finite is again witnessed in a testimony to their distinc
tion.

Apostolic love and romantic love are two occasions not

relatively distinct but absolutely distinct.

45

In the fifth Edifying Discourse entitled "Strengthened in
the Inner Man" S^ren Kierkegaard considers how the occasion is
to be used in relation to the religious.

Johannes de Silentio

has described the movements of the Knight of Faith in two steps.
The first step (as far as the Knight of Infinite Resignation
goes) is to renounce the occasions of earthly concern.

For the

Knight of Faith another step must be taken, the entire human
activity must be overcome and itself become the occasion for
strengthening the inner man.

Although Johannes de Silentio can

not yet make this step, in the fifth Edifying Discourse is found

44

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 85.

45 Or what has a believer in common with an unbeliever?
What agreement has the temple of God with the idols? Cor. 6:15-16.
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50
a highly favored man blessed with prosperity who nevertheless
is a Knight of Faith and is described at the hour of death like
this:
♦..but when in the stillness of the night the call
comes:
"Bender an accounting for your stewardship,"
then he knows what this summons means; he knows how
the account stands, and even if there is something
lacking, he confidently quits the world of thought
and action, which still had not possessed his soul;
abandons the elaborately complex and extensive labor,
which from day to day had furnished him the occasion
for strengthening the inner m a n . 46
Regarding the occasion in this fashion enables the understand
ing to witness life's movements not as if bound to explain
the occasion in terms of its own exhaustive phenomenology (as
if the occasion could exist in such a fashion except in despair),
but rather to understand the occasion in terms of the Infinite
apart from which there are only appearances.
So whether you eat or drink or whatever you do,
do all to the glory of God.47

46

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 118.

47

I Cor. 10:31.
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Chapter 3»

Either/Or

.

So I make plans like a worldly map,
ready to say yes and no at o n c e . 4°
Kierkegaard’s ironic use of either/or is taken from Socrates
The intensive use of this expression draws its strength from the
quest for the infinite by means of the negative.
No, it is a Socrates who relishes the play of light
and shadow entailed in a syllogistic aut-aut, when
almost at the same instant appear the noontide of
day and the pitch black of night, the infinitely
real and infinite n o t h i n g n e s s . 49
There is a similarity of intensity in this concept as there was
in the concept

of the moment.

The reason for incorporating

such a term as either/or is to enable the conception of exist
ence to escape
necessity.

becoming systematized and reduced to logical

The passionate freedom existing within either/or

far outweighs for Kierkegaard, the determined mediation of
Hegel's system.

By using either/or the reader is forced to

choose between Socrates and Hegel.

If speculative philosophy

is possible in its mediation then either/or is insignificant.
And if either/or is possible, speculation is ridiculous.
Either/or as a category of existence for Kierkegaard was
absolutely opposed to mediation.

And yet either/or was es

sential, if man was to be open to the possibility of religion.
Understood in relation to mediation or speculative philosophy,
48

II Cor. 1:18.

49

Concept of Irony, p. 117.
51
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either/or could be seen only in its absolute negativity.

Even

though disenchanted by Hegelian mediation either/or leaves a
man starving like the hungry donkey between two hay stacks.
The advantage of either/or over mediation resides in the fact
that in the case of either/or at least the stacks of hay are
real and the donkey is actually starving!
It is not the purpose of Authors A and B to win the
reader either to accepting the aesthetic or the ethical, but
rather to point out the negativity of the either/or stance.
For as Kierkegaard illustrates, it is not he who chooses either
this or that, but he who becomes an either/or that understands
the meaning of Either/Or.

If one simply chose an either/or

that choice itself could be mediated forward.

It was the pur

pose of Kierkegaard to show man precisely as he was.

Only by

becoming an either/or was man able to see clearly where religion
did not lie.

Otherwise, man would continue on with the business

of Christendom regarding religion as he did the other words
mediated within the system of speculative philosophy.
Similar to the word moment and its development into the
concept of the instant Kierkegaard develops the term either/or
into the concept of fear and trembling.

Initially either/or

is seen in its relation to Socratic irony.

Once the negativity

of either/or gives way to a positive expression the more im
portant concept of fear and trembling is born.

This is not to

deny the place of either/or in Kierkegaard's authorship.

Rather

it points out that as Kierkegaard begins to confront the pseu
donymous writers with the religious, something other than the
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ironic expression of either/or is needed,

When Johannes de

Silentio studies Abraham it becomes obvious that something
other than either/or is demanded.
As is the case throughout the aesthetic stage of Kierke
gaard's authorship the understanding of pseudonymous vocabulary
becomes plain in the Edifying Discourses.

Having been exhausted

by the irony of Author A and Author B, S^ren Kierkegaard seeks
to edify in his discourses.

The entire mood has been changed,

the absolute negativity of either/or and its constant motion
from this vein to that is abruptly done away within

the dis

courses where faith and not irony take command.
50

It is true that he who expects something
in par
ticular may be disappointed; but this does not
happen to the believer...he still says:
"There
is an expectation which all the world can not
take from me; it is the expectation of faith and
this is victory...my expectation was not in the
world but in God.51
The pseudonymous category of either/or has been radically
overcome in the eternity of faith, that faith which edifies!

50 Some either of this or some of that, or even of having
this either/or.
51

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 39.
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Chapter 4.

Fear and Trembling

Fear and trembling come upon me,
and horror overwhelms me.
e-p
And I say, "0 that I had wings like a dove!"
As a religious expression fear and trembling is a more
traditionally understandable conception than either/or or
repetition.

In Johannes de Silentio's book of that same title

fear and trembling is seen in relation to Abraham's act of
faith.
I know now that you fear God, since you have not
withheld your only son from me.53
In the hands of the non-Hegelian Johannes de Silentio fear
and trembling is used to point out that true religious faith
possesses a quality entirely different from any other human
experience.

The paradoxical fear and trembling of faith is

absolutely distinct from the mediations of Hegelian philosophy,
the poetic passion of Shakespere, the demands of the universal
on the particular or the immediacy of aestheticism.
Johannes de Silentio is producing an entire book just to
let the faithful conception of fear and trembling stand firm
in its traditional usage.
52

Psalms 55:5-6.

53

Genesis 22:12.

54

No progress in humanity, culture,

54 And I was with you in weakness and in much
trembling; and my speech and my message were not in
words of wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit
that your faith might not rest in the wisdom of men
power of God. I Cor. 2:3-5.

fear and
plausible
and power,
but in the

54
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or philosophy will ever take fear and trembling from the act of
faith.

If a man ever arrives at that point where his faith is

essentially different from that experienced by Abraham he will
have allowed the paradoxical and passionate nature of faith to
be replaced by something else.

Reflecting on that faith which

so far he has not chosen, Johannes de Silentio states that
it is impossible to find anything more passionate than the
act of faith, and that any talk of going beyond faith is simply
another way of refusing to accept it for what it is.
In our time nobody is content to stop with faith but
wants to go further.
It would perhaps be rash to
ask where these people are going, but it is surely
a sign of breeding and culture for me to assume that
everybody has faith, for otherwise it would be queer
for them to be...going further.55
In choosing the sub-title "a dialectical lyric" to the
book title Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard allows the interest
ed, though yet unbelieving Johannes de Silentio to reflect on
the religious conception of fear and trembling.

It is obvious

that fear and trembling could be the subject of a religiously
edifying discourse, but such a book could not be written by
the non-believing Johannes de Silentio.

By placing Johannes

de Silentio in a dialectically lyrical relationship to the
fear and trembling of faith, Kierkegaard has taken the non
believer one step further along the way in showing him pre
cisely where he is.

For within the book Fear and Trembling

the author sees clearly the difference between his lyrical
regard for faith, and Abraham who in fear and trembling chose
to believe.
55

As an apologist Kierkegaard was aware that he

Fear and Trembling, p. 23.
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could not force faith on to another, but rather only make
clear the difference between believing and not believing.
Johannes de Silentio can only be negatively interested in
faith since he only regards it lyrically.
I am convinced that God is love, this thought
has for me a primitive lyrical validity.5°
The lyrical apprehension of faith, however, is not the
same as giving up the possibility of faith or abandoning it to
some necessary category within a logical system.

Johannes de

Silentio is better off than the Hegelian members of Christendom
in that he is still able to will to believe since he has not
ruled out the possibility beforehand.

Yet Johannes is in

despair to the degree that he wills to remain where he is.
By putting this entire discussion in the hands of lyrical
minded Johannes de Silentio Kierkegaard saves his apologetic
from becoming pleased with its recognition of the fact that
Abraham's fear and trembling is different than other human
experience.

As soon as the clarifying stage of apologetics

becomes a substitute for faith itself, then apologetics destroys
the possibility of faith and is no longer an apologetic but
rather a negative force acting in despair against belief.
Whereas Hegelianized Christianity seeks to go beyond fear
and trembling not realizing that by doing such it has become
anti-Christian, Johannes de Silentio at least distinguishes
between fear and trembling as a lyrical expression and as an
essential increment of faith.
56

Fear and Trembling, p. 45.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

But the highest passion in a man is faith, and
here no generation begins at any other point than
did the preceding generation, every generation
begins all over again, the subsequent generation
gets no further than the foregoing— in so far as
this remained faithful to its task and did not
leave it in the lurch.
It is only when man goes beyond the either/or stance in
relation to time and human activity that he stands in re
lation to fear and trembling.

Pear and trembling is the faith

ful category that belongs to Abraham, either/or is the category
of infinite resignation that belongs to Socrates.

The advantage

of becoming an either/or, however, does not positively destroy
the

possibility of fearand trembling but simply regards the

passion of believing in

an absolutely negative fashion.

Only

a man of faith experiences fear and trembling.
The words of the pseudonymous authors cannot in any positive
manner edify the reader.

58

Yet with the writing of Johannes

de Silentio the fear and trembling of the believer stands apart
from the other expressions of human activity.

On the other

hand, the writing of S^ren Kierkegaard does edify because in
his discourses it is assumed that the reader adready is a
believer and already has begun not with the wisdom of men but
50
with the wisdom of God. J
57
58
power."

Pear and Trembling, p. 130.
'For the kingdom of God does not consist in talk but in
I Cor. 4:20.

59 But if you have bitter jealously and selfish ambition in
your hearts, do not boast and be false to the truth. This wisdom
is not such as comes down from above, but is earthly, unspiritual
devilish...
But the wisdom from above is first pure then peace
able, gentle, open to reason, full of mercy and good fruits, with
out uncertainty or insincerity." James 3:14...17.
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When either/or is converted into fear and trembling some
thing other than the finite self becomes the measure of man.
It is not until man escapes the despair of regarding all things
in relation to himself only that he is able to define himself
religiously.

When a personality becomes an either/or it is

so absorbed in the strife of self-idenity that it never be
comes more than a shadow of itself in motion.

When fear and

trembling enter the personality the constant dialectic of
being either "this" or "that" is overcome.

The negativity of

either/or is abandoned as the personality in fear and trembling
relates itself to the Infinite.

The self-directed despair of

becoming an either/or is left behind and replaced by the ac
cepted willingness of a becoming in fear and trembling.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Part III

The Relationship of the Future
to the Possibility of Repetition
Chapter 1.

The Future

So let no one boast of men. For all things are yours,
whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas or the world or life
or death or the present or the future, all are yours.1
The first Edifying Discourse, entitled "The Expectation of
Faith" is written to be read on New Year’s Day when everyone is
thinking particularly about the inscrutable possibilities involved
in the future.
As the number of those who expect something always con
stitutes the majority of the world, so too their
expectations can be so various that it is very difficult
to mention all of them. Yet all of them have one expec
tation in common, that they all expect some future.^
One wonders how various people come to regard the future.
the future simply the past remembered forward?

Is

Does one find

himself building the future on those joyful or sorrowful moments
which have already taken place?

On the other hand can one only

be "enslaved like the beasts, his head bent toward the earth,
his soul ensnared in the service of the moment?"3 If there is
only the present, what is there of man that differentiates him
1

I Cor. 3:21-22

2

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 31.

3

Ibid.
59
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from the other animals?

The future then cannot be regarded as

the past put into the service of tomorrow.
present.

Nor can it be the

If the future were the present there could be no ex

pectation.

In the finite order of time one cannot expect what

one has.
The tendency of the Romantic poet to view the future as
the past, is well expressed by Author A in his introductory re
frains :
An so it is with me: always before me an empty
space; what drives me.forward is a consistency
which lies behind me.
These words reflect Kierkegaard's continual insistence that
German Romanticism never breaks the bonds of its own reflective
poetry.

Author A begins and ends imprisoned within his own

poetic reflections.

The Romanticist for Kierkegaard is incapable

of expressing the future, but simply echos again and again the
past.

The reflective man could never say what S^ren Kierkegaard

says initially in the first Edifying Discourse:
The past is completed; the present is not; only the
future is, which yet is n o t . 5
Compare this to Author A's consideration of hope:
I can describe hope so vividly that every hoping
individual will acknowledge my description; and
yet it is a deception, for while I picture hope,
I think of memory.°
4

Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 24.

5

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 23.

6

Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 35.
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In "The Ancient Tragical Motif As Reflected in the Modern " 1
Author A, after showing that the modern idea of the tragical is
reflective anxiety and so is essentially different than the
Q

Greek

concept of sorrow, says:

In addition, anxiety always involves a reflection
upon time, for I cannot he anxious about the present,
but only about the past or the future; but the past ’
and the future so resisting one another that theq
present vanishes, are reflective determinations.
In so far as the future is regarded as a reflective category,
it can only probe around about the future or posit the whole
future in the present moment, yet so that the present moment
instantly dissolves in succession.

It is clear that Author A

cannot break into the real, but again

must return to hisre

flection of the past.
Author B reviews the case of Author A concerning the future
with great passion:
You turn towards the future,
for action is always
futuristic. You say, "I caneither do this or do
that, but whichever of the two I do is equally mad,
ergo I do nothing at all.
The point being made here is that either the word future means
something other than the past under another form, or the future
7

The title of the second chapterofSither/Or, Vol.

I.

8
But since in order to experiencesorrow,the tragic
guilt
must have this vagueness, so reflection must not be present in its
infinitude, for then it would reflect her out of her guilt, because
reflection in its infinite subjectivity cannot let the element of
inherited guilt remain, which causes the sorrow.
(Either/Or,
Vol. I, p. 152.)
9
10

Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 153.
Either/Or, Vol. II, p. 174.
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and the past are identified.
B is condemning Author A for.

‘
The later is precisely what Author
For if the future and the past

are simply the same thing under different names, whether Author
A wishes to "do nothing at all" or whether he wishes to play
with words regarding them once as the future and then once as
the past, doesn’t really matter at all.

The whole matter has

fallen under the shadow of subjectivism.
Carrying the discussion further Author B points out the
inability of philosophy to answer the question about the future.
Now I assume that philosophy is in the right, that
the principle of contradiction really is annulled,
or that the philosophers transcend it every instant
in the higher unity which exists for thought. This
however, surely cannot hold with respect to the future,
for the oppositions must first be in existence before
I can mediate them. But if the oppositions are there,
then there must be an either/or.
The philosopher says,
"That’s the way i t ’s been hitherto." I ask, "What am
I to do if I do not want to be a philosopher?"H
Again the future is to be found in the past.

The Romantic poet

and the Hegelian philosopher have lost any real contact with the
future because they have failed to notice the ideality-in-thepast of their reflections.
What can only be reflected out of the past by the poet and
what can only be mediated and mediated and mediated by the phi
losopher as the future is caste aside in the Edifying Discourses:
Through the eternal can one conquer the future, because
the eternal is the foundation of the future; therefore
through this one can understand that. What then is the
eternal power in man? It is faith...The believer is
therefore done with the future before he begins on the
Either/Or, Vol. II, p. 175. Relating this statement
to the overall apologetic of Kierkegaard, the reader might well
ask the question, "What am I to do if I do not want to be a
theologian?"
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present; for what one has conquered no longer has power
to disturb one, and this victory can only make one more
powerful for the present.12
What has become of reflection?
importance.

It has lost its place of romantic

Anxiety over the future has been overcome by faith.

By a faithful look at the future the author of the "Expectation
of Faith" has inverted the modern preoccupations with reflective
subjectivity by refusing to accept them in the beginning."^
If Hegelian philosophy is concerned with the real, and as
such is more than a system of thought, then the future as medi
ated in that philosophy stands of itself and "the expectation of
faith" can only be an appendage added to it or mediated from it.
On the other hand if the future in Hegelian philosophy is con
cerned with the past to such a degree that.the future is nothing
other than past re-stated, then the future as "the expectation of
faith" is an entirely different matter which in letters only
resembles the future as mediated.
The understanding of faith presented by S^ren Kierkegaard
enables one to regard much eschatological talk as a preoccupation
concerned with reflective categories.

No matter how preoccupied

one becomes in regard to the future, or how poetically satis
fied one wishes to see the future, the future for Sj^ren Kierke
gaard can be had only through faith and this faith can be had only
through being constantly developed.
12

In no way can a person get

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 34.

13
For S^ren Kierkegaard and for the Christian, "In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word
was God." John 1:1.
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beyond the future, and in no way can a person mediate to the
future.

The future is united to the infinite and can only be

witnessed in man at that point where ideality and actuality merge.
This is the place where consciousness is relationship.

The man

ifold theories of subjectivism can be extensively reflected in
the thought world of ideality, but they cannot touch actuality
except in the consciousness of man.
Eeflection is the mere disinterested process of set
ting thing against thing in collision.
Consciousness
is the place where this process takes place; indeed
it is the energizing force behind the process. There
alone doubt can reside. And consciousness is not
disinterested. '4
Nor can finite considerations get beyond themselves.

For

continually they are condemned to the moment of their expression.
Something other than a series of finite moments is needed to
understand the future.

For the author of "The Expectation of

Faith" the future regarded solely in its finitude is a dangerous
enemy.
He who fights with the future has a more dangerous
enemy, he can never remain ignorant about himself;
for he fights with himself. The future is not; it
borrows its strength from the man himself, and when
it has tricked him out of this, then it appears out
side of him as the enemy he must meet. Let a man
then be as strong as he will, no man is stronger
than himself.15
How then for Soren Kierkegaard is a man to be armed for the con
flict with the future?

He immediately dismissed the commonly

14 S^ren Kierkegaard. Johannes Climacus or, De Omnibus Dubitandum Est and A Sermon, translated by T. II. Crox&ll, L. L.
(Stanford, 1967), P* ’HT!.
15

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 32.
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approved defenders, as Job did his "friends."

Experience as a

friend has a double tongue, guessing is a deceitful guide, sup
position is a vague glance and conclusion is a sling where a man
more often catches himself than the o t h e r . ^

Imagine what would

happen to modern man if these four "friends of the finite" lost
their "infinite gloss."
rotate

17

And yet as long as man is content to

these ideas intensively and extensively so as to keep

busily away from "Him without whom was not anything made,"

1 fi

the future remains determined and boring in the past.
The only understanding of the future which S^ren Kierkekaard
treats as real is that which expects victory.

This entire matter

is in the hands of faith and the future which edifies is the
future of the believer.
And today on the first day of the year, when the
thought about the future thrusts itself upon me,
I will not satiate my soul with various expecta
tions, nor dissipate it in manifold ideas; I will
rally it, and, sound and happy, if possible, go
forth to meet the future.
It brings what it will
and must bring; many expectations disappointed,
many fulfilled, so it will happen, as experience
has taught me; but there is an expectation which
will not be dissappointed; experience has not
iq
taught expectation of faith, and this is victory. ^
16

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. 37.

17 "The Rotation Method" was the title of the
chapter of Either/Or, Vol. I. It is also the place where
Kierkegaard"first begins to develop the concept which will
eventually be called "Repetition."
18

John 1:3

19

Edifying Discourses, Vol. I, p. A q .
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Chapter 2.

Repetition

Jesus answered, "Amen, amen, I say to thee, unless
a man be born again of water and the g^irit, he
cannot enter into the kingdom of God . ^
Like most of Kierkegaard's aesthetic vocabulary, repetition
receives its initial exposition in Sither/Or.
...only sensuous love, in terms of its very concept,
is essentially faithless. But this, its faithless
ness, appears also in another wav* it becomes in
fact only a constant repetition.^•
This faithlessness which becomes repetition is precisely that
form of faithless sensuousness which, while in pursuit of momen
tary pleasure, allows the personality to be overcome by boredom.
Author A does not let the matter rest here.
the personality this boredom.

He hopes to save

In Mozart's Lon Juan sensuous

faithlessness is not mediated into language.

As soon as the

listener holds the immediate sensuousness of Mozart's Lon Juan
firm (mediates the musical Lon Juan into the idea of Don Juan)
Don Juan vanishes.

Repetition of faithless sensuousness into

the category of boredom is impossible within the immediacy of
Mozart's Don Juan.
Along the same lines of preserving aesthetical immediacy,
Author A records an essay on social prudence:

"The Rotation

20 John 3:5.
"Unless a man be born anothen" The Greek
another has the double meaning of "from abore" and "again."
(hew Testament Readier Guide, commentary by Raymond Brown
[ C o irig r“fn 7 7 1113537; '
“Tib577 0 . 26.)
21

Sltner/Or, Vol* i , o . 33*

66
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Method."2^

In this essay the socially prudent man learns to

cleverly control all pleasure so as not to become bored with
its charms.

By shrewdly manipulating the various moments of

pleasure Author A hopes to overcome the ennui of repetition.
No moment must be permitted so great a significance
that it cannot be forgotten when convenient; each
moment ought however, to have so much significance
that it can be recollected at will.23
Author A praises the art of remembering and forgetting in their
role of "insuring against sticking fast in some relationships
of life, and making possible the realization of a complete free
dom."2^

On the other hand Author A warns against friendship

and even more so marriage.

The reason being that "the essential

thing is never to stick fast, and for this it is necessary to
have oblivion back of one."

25

The whole secret of' this shrewd

repetition lies in arbitrariness.

The person confined to this

stage must be willing to transform something accidental into the
absolute, and as such into the object of his admiration.
The immediate sensuousness of Mozart's Don Juan is a more
delicate investigation of the aesthetic than is the shrewdness
of "The Rotation Method."

The first deals with the basic aes

thetic notion of erotic senuousness as expressed in the musical.
22

See footnote number 17» Part III, p. 65,

23

Either/Or, Vol. I, p. 289.

24

Ibid., p. 291.

25

Ibid., p. 292.
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The second deals with man's manipulation of senuous pleasure
when located outside the musical.

Kierkegaard's most complete

presentation of this position comes in the "Diary of a Seducer."
The discussion of Mozart's Don Juan is directed toward those
m o d e m European aesthetes who were yet aware of the graceful
beauty of Greek aestheticism.

"The Rotation Method" was more

concerned to speak to the quasi-aesthetic personality whose
involvement with the "beautiful" was not free from the sticky
fingers of m o d e m pragmatism.
Author B sees the matter differently.

For him, if repeti

tion is impossible, the possibility of ethics is forever abandoned.
By its very nature ethics is related to the universal
to immediate sensuousness.

26

and not

Nearly the entire production of

Author B is consumed in the effort to defend the aesthetic valid
ity of marriage.

(granted its -unchanging ethical structure)

Directing himself to Author A, Author B states:
It is no wonder you are alarmed and that you associate
these signs and "gesticulations" with things of which
one dare not say decies repetita placebunt; for if
that which gives them value was the characteristic
qualification "the first time," a repetition is indeed
impossible. But healthy love has an entirely different
worth; it is in time it accomplishes its work, and
therefore, it will be capable of rejuvenation itself
by means of these outward signs, and (what to me is the
principal thing) it has an entirely different conception
of time and the significance of repetition.27
The reader of Either/Or is left with two alternatives, or as
26 The relation of ethics to the universal is taken up
again at length in Fear and Trembling.
27

Either/Or,"Vol. II, p. 144.
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Kierkegaard, puts it, "he becomes an either/or."
immediacy of Mozart's Don Juan or marriage?

28

The sensuous

The immediacy of

Don Juan escapes the ethical constancy of marriage.

Marriage

is left in boredom if sensuous immediacy is absent.

This is as

far as Authors A and B can go.

The ironic disembodiment of the

Hegelian categories is again obvious.

Any hope of mediating the

aesthetic as immediate sensuousness and the aesthetic viewed
ethically into the category of marriage is impossible.
Up to this point Kierkegaard has not fully intuited the
concept of repetition which is to be the theme of Constantius*
book.

So far, repetition is defined more in accord with the

common designation.
boredom, and time.

That is, in relation to "the first,"

29

Not until Kierkegaard begins Johannes

Climacus Or, Do Omnibus Dubitandum Est-^ does the concept of
repetition begin to blossom into its own.
It is when Ideality and Reality-^1 (i.e. Actuality)
are put into contact with each other that Repetition
appears. When, for example, I see something "in the
moment," Ideality intervenes and explains that it is
a repetition. There is opposition here, because that
which was existing, exists again in another manner.
That this outward object exists, that I can see. But
28

Bither/Or, Vol. II, p. 161.

29 Although not discussed in this essay "the first" is an
important category both in Either/Or (Chapter six, Vol. I, is
entitled "The First Love.") and in the Edifying Discourses.
(Especially in Vol. I, the last paragraph of the fifth Discourse
"Blessed the man who can truly say: God in heaven was my first
love." P. 129)
30

This work was never completed.

It was begun In 1 g 42.

31

In the sense that immediacy is reality.
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at the same time I bring it into relationship with
something else which also exists, something which is
the same too. Here is a twofoldness, one resembling-^
the other. Here we can r i g h t l y speak of Repetition,
When actuality is seen "in the moment" or as "history repeats
itself," it is not seen as tempered by "Ideality."

Left un

tempered, actuality finds itself lost in the ambiguousness of
human experience.
For experience as a friend has a double tongue which
says now one thing, now another; and guessing is a
deceitful guide who deserts one when one needs him
most, and the supposition is a vague glance which
does not look very far, and the conclusion is a sling
wherein a man more often catches himself than the
other. In addition, those weapons are difficult to
use; for with guessing goes fear, with conjecture
apprehension, with the conclusion disquiet, since
the questing soul does not remain unmoved by the
experience.33
On the other hand how does Ideality (Eternity) help to ex
plain repetition present within m a n ’s finite existence?
Eternity [Ideality] does not participate in this
contingency,
[of actuality]. It is: unchangeable,
"necessary" (opposite of contingent), permanent.
Obviously there can be no repetition in a sphere
which cannot change or admit of new factors.34
Whereas actuality is regarded as totally submerged in the moment,
Eternity can of itself have nothing to do with this time-bound
actuality.

Apparently repetition is impossible.

an unending series of unrelated moments.

Time presents

Ideality (Eternity)

remains aloof in its timeless unchangeableness.

Edifying Discourses
3A
P. &K-

-t-u
?7oix&nriss ClimaeuSj ■ cen irom 'jroxaij. *s '’A n assessment*
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In solving this diLemma of repetition Kierkegaard is aware
of three historical positions.
of German romanticism.

Closest at hand is the solution

According to this mode of thinking,

existence is apparently left open to freedom (away from boredom)
by establishing the present and the future in an ’’echoed" re
lationship to the past.

An attempt to make the present and the

future distinct from the past and yet dependent on the past is
a common feature of German romanticism.

There exists a hidden

reductionism in romanticism which defines everything in relation
to something that is assumed to be present in the past.

Roman

ticism seeks out the historical in existence, makes that the
subject of its art and by using language well, hopes to convert
the historical on its own merit into a trans-historical impor
tance.

Again the attempt on the part of German Romanticism to

mediate the finite into the infinite is made obvious.
Socrates has another solution.

He begins his investigation

of human freedom in relation to Ideality.

This process is re

ferred to as Recollection.
The error of the Sophist is in seeking to arrogate
something to man; the Socratic, on the other hand, in
denying in every sense that virtue can be taught.
Hence it is obvious that this Socratic conception is
negative:
it negates life, development, in short,
history in its most universal and widest sense. The
Sophist negates original history, Socrates subsequent
history.— If we next inquire to what more universal
consideration this Socratic view must be referred,
in what totality it reposes, then it obviously has the
significance attributed to recollection. Recollection
is retrograde development, however, and hence the re
flected image of development in the strict sense...
The Socratic approach, on the other hand, is to get
the whole of actuality disaffirmed, and then refer man
kind to a recollection that recedes further and further

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright o w n er Further reproduction prohibited without permission

toward a past itself receding as far back in time
as the origin of that noble family which no one
can remember.35
In the case of German Romanticism the present is exhausted in
relation to the past.

Thus reducing all human experience to

the level of historical relationship.
the present in light of the past.

Socrates also regards

Yet in the case of Socrates

the present is not exhausted in its relation to the past but
rather the present stands in an ironical relationship to the
past which is a relationship of infinite comparing and reject
ing.

This ironic understanding of existence brought to light

in Socrates is well illustrated in the dialogue of grotagoras.
...the negative lies in the always necessarily
and inherently fatal dissatisfaction of an in
finite empiricism, the irony in the 'bon appetit!',
so to speak, which Socrates wishes Protagoras.3°
Socrates escapes an interpretation of existence which rests
momentarily in the finite-historical.

Though negative in nature,

the concept of Socratic irony remains open to the possibility
of the infinite.

Such an openness is demanded of any language

which is to be called religious (or apologetic).
The third position is that of Christianity.

Here human

freedom exists in the instantaneous presence of time and etern
ity.

When temporal existence is realized anew in this instan

taneous presence of time and eternity that repetition is born
which is the title and subject of Constantine Constantius' book.
35

The Concept of Irony, p. 97.

36

Ibid., p. 98.
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Constantius begins by pointing out the difference between
hope, recollection and repetition:
Hope is a new garment, starched and stiff and glit
tering, yet one has never had it on, and hence one
does not know how it will become one and how it
fits. Hecollection is a discarded garment, which
beautiful as it may be, does not fit, for one has
outgrown it. Repetition is an imperishable garment,
which fits snugly and confortably, neither too tight
nor too loose. Hope is a charming maiden but slips
through the fingers, recollection is a beautiful
old woman but of no use at the instant, repetition
is a beloved wife of whom one never tires.37
Without calling up Christianity to present its own case (Con
stantius being quite unable to do such, not being a man of faith)
Constantius expresses concern for a positive principle of human
freedom which asserts something other than a relationship to the
past.

Further he desires a new word which will describe to

rational man what it is to be open to the future in such a way
as to somehow escape the negativity of Greek recollection.
a word he discovers is repetition.

Such

The hidden truth of the mat

ter is that such a word, though found on the lips of the areligious Constantius, depends from beginning to end upon a
positive principle within religion.

Not until the end of the

book does Constantius see the religious nature of the entire in
vestigation.

Initially in a Pelagian attire Constantius dis

cusses the matter as if on his own he could resolve it.

But

having fled up and down the labyrinthine ways of his own mind,
Constantius finally admits of the religious starting point of
his searching.

37

Repetition, p. 34.
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As was often the case with Kierkegaard's publications,
Repetition was well received but for the wrong reasons.

The

most serious level of concern present within the book was gen
erally disregarded.

Finally after one prominent Danes' review

Constantine Constantius is driven to compose a fifty-five page
reply.

"A Little Plea" by Constantine Constantius, author of

Repetition finds repetition in three forms:

repetition (A) in

relation to pleasure; repetition (B) in relation to shrewdness;
repetition (C) in relation to freedom itself.

This third form

is the matter of the work Repetition, even though the author,
Constantius, goes a considerable way to point out psychologi
cally how in the case of this repetition (C) one is deceived
by repetition (A) and (B).
Repetition (A).
pleasure.

Freedom first is defined as pleasure or in

What it now fears is repetition.

It is as if repe

tition possessed a magic power to hold freedom captive when
once it had contrived to get it under its influence.

Yet in

spite of all the inventiveness of pleasure repetition makes its
appearance.

At this stage, the psychological "moment" of plea

sure is let stand for what it is.

In so far as each moment of

pleasure condemns a man to that particular moment alone, all
hope of continuity of life vanishes and pleasure falls into de
spair.

There is a fear of repetition present, but it is not

repetition (C).

Repetition at this stage is of that kind which

finds man wishing pleasure to last forever when he is fully
aware that every pleasurable moment is precisely pleasurable
because of its definite time limit.

A personality defined in
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relation to "pleasure-moment" despairs of itself in that it
chooses to be closed off from any relation with Ideality or
Eternity.
Repetition (B).

Here freedom is defined as shrewdness.

Repetition is assumed to exist, but it is the task
of freedom to see constantly a new side of repeti
tion. .. However, since freedom defined as shrewd
ness is only finitely characterized, repetition must
again make its appearance, that is repetition of the
trick by '' ‘
'
’
ts to delude repetition
and make
In repetition (A) pleasure is itself seen in the desperate
moment.
There are well-known insects which die in the
moment of fecundation.
So it is with all joy;
life's supreme and richest moment of pleasure is
coupled with death.39
The relation of one pleasurable moment to another is left aside.
In repetition (B) the shrewd manipulations of finite moments
are themselves found to be in despair.

Finally repetition (A)

and (B) are found wanting for the same reason.

In either case

human experience is found lost in the momentary satisfaction of
the finite and closed off to the infinite.
Repetition (C) is another kind.

At this point freedom does

not seek pleasure or shrewdness, but repetition itself.

Realiz

ing that repetition (A) and (B) of themselves cannot reconcile
life's moments in any real way, freedom wishes to keep repetition
rather as a means for justifying itself, that is, for making
38

Repetition, p. 12.
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freedom possible.
In case it should come about that freedom in the
individual, related as it is to the environment,
might remain, so to speak, lying in the result,
so that it cannot withdraw
(repeat itself), then
all is lost. So then what
freedom now fears is
not repetition but change,
what it wills is not
change but repetition.4°
Whereas repetition (A) and (B) were finally condemned to the
finitude of the pleasurable moment and shrewdness, freedom
itself calls for repetition (C)

to keep itself free. If

free

dom is to be present in the individual, repetition must be
possible in order to enable freedom to escape the determinism
of the moment.
The Kierkegaardian dialectic is hard at work.

Repetition

(A) and (B) destroy freedom as reflected in pleasure and shrewd
ness.

Repetition (G) is demanded by Treedom as reflected in

'freedom itself.

Repetition (A) and (B) are not mediated into

a third higher repetition.

Either the assumptions of repetition

(A) and (B) are true, and so freedom is impossible, or repetition
(C) is possible and repetition (A) and (B) are seen as categories
of despair.

Constantius uses repetition (A) and (B) to deceive

the reader into accepting an interest in repetition (C).
Finally freedom in the individual is possible only if
repetition (C) is possible.

And yet, repetition (C) is neither

the product of, nor in accord with repetition (A) and (B).
Then when Stoicism has stepped aside there remains
only the religious movement as the true expression
40

Repetition, p. 12.
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77
of repetition, and in its strife it announces itself ...
with the passionate eloquence of the anxious freedom.
Constantine Constantius cannot deal with repetition (C).
is not his concern.

That

He is simply searching modern culture to

see how it handles such a problem outside the religious category
of faith.

Constantius winds up disconcerted and empty handed.

At the deepest level of existence his culture was unable to pro
vide the necessary vocabulary.

Constantius finds himself in a

state similar to Hegel in Hegel's imagined dialogue with
Socrates.
Socrates:
Hegel:
Socrates:
Hegel:
Socrates:
Hegel:

Shall we begin by being in complete dis
agreement, or shall we agree about a thing
we might call a presupposition?
(silent)
7/hat presupposition do you begin with?
With none at all.
Splendid!
Then I suppose you do not begin
at all?
I not begin, who have written twenty-one
volumes?^

41

Repetition, pp. 12-13.

42

J. 552 (VI.A. 145)

Cited in Johannes Climacus, p. 61.
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Part IV

Concluding Repetition
For the word of the cross is folly to those who
are perishing, hut to us who are being saved it
is the power of God.
In staging the problem of how one is to become a Christian
Kierkegaard has looked carefully both at the Christian and at
the non-believer.

The believer is noted for his passionate wil

lingness to believe,

to live, to suffer and to be happy.

The

unbeliever is bored.

As an apologist Kierkegaard is concerned

mainly with the Christian happiness as it stands over against
boredom.

Whether one is faithfully happy or unbelievably bored

depends in large part on how one regards his time.

Thus the

initial thrust of Kierkegaard's aesthetic authorship is con
cerned with the time bound moment.
Kierkegaard is suggesting that if we take a close look
around us boredom consists in a disproportionate ordering of
time.

There is a time to go to work, a time to read the news

paper, a time to eat, a time to watch television, a time to
recreate, a time to have children, a time to drink beer, a time
to make love, a time to be born, a time to go to church, a time
to read more books, a time to go to school, a time to get mar
ried, a time to think, and finally a time to die.
1

The entire

I Cor. 1:18.
78
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life span of man is filled with moments of clock-caic.ulated
activity.

The happy life, in terms of technological society,

is the full life.

Advertizing soaks the imagination with this

idea, psychology illustrates the necessity of keeping this
notion of time equitably balanced, education helps everyone
realize this fact, sociology showers it on to the less for
tunate, and "theology" sanctifies this notion.
Suppose that life, packaged out in these time-bound moments,
was to become boring?

Suppose that the pursuit of time-bound

pleasure was e x p l i c i t l y

proven to be boring.

Suppose that

the poor man didn’t seek out the pleasurable moments of the mid
dle class and the middle class forgot for an instant to be in
fatuated with the splendid use of time projected by the upper
class.

Suppose that happiness didn't depend in any way on more

money, a better job, better education, a secure future or even
talk about these things.

Suppose that the entire super-structure

of modern culture could be proven to be boring.
lieve it?

Who would be

Who has the time for such a thought?

Kierkegaard looked around and saw Copenhagen as busy and
bored.

Wow since part of this time-bound activity included

going to church, and in writing MA theses in theology surely
religion is just as busy and just as boring as the rest of
culture.

In fact it appeared that theology was the busiest and

most boring activity of all, since it was supposed, by some, to
be at the center of things.

Kierkegaard saw Christendom to be

a busy, pluralistic, unhappy, ambiguous moment of boredom,
2 Could this be an adequate definition of Worth American
theology?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80

Now a man who saw what Kierkegaard saw could quit going to
church and begin to look around for his soul.
however, was not so fortunate.

The average man,

He is so lost in his moments-

of-time that he either doesn't recognize this state of boredom
and so remains as he is, sees it and keeps going to church
though secretly in despair about the whole matter, or sees it,
quits going to church, but can't find the time to look around for
his soul.

The pseudonymous authors make it evident that living

within this boring order of moments is not peculiar to any one
type of man.

It includes the fragmented personality, the ex

perimental psychologist and the poet.

Everyone stands in

relation to the moment similarly.

There is no temporal means

of escaping the demands of time.

The only means of overcoming

boredom is in overcoming time.
lem?

Who even cares about such a prob

For the few who care Kierkegaard develops the common word,

the instant.

Since man has always had time, since he has al

ways lived in a finite world, if you take time away man is gone.
But can't man overcome this time?

"Yes," answers Kierkegaard,

Time can be overcome and it is in the instant that Eternity
breaks through into this time.

Then the boredom of the momen

tary experience is radically reduced to nothing and made over
again into everything.
But then, one asks, on what occasion will this take place.
At what time can I count on converting a moment into an instant?
Let me recollect, will it be on Hew Years, at next Sunday's
worship service, at the completion of my education, at the
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"birth, of a child, when I choose a bride, when I purchase a house,
when I take a joint, or when I convince myself of my righteous
ness?

Could it be that the occasion, as so well ordered by

technological man, is incapable of ever allowing for the possi
bility of the instant?

Could it be that regardless of the

sermon, the day, the country, the music, or the community that
the occasion of itself cannot determine the instant?
And yet won't something so time-less as an instant cause a
person to worry, see a psychiatrist or maybe even return as
quickly as possible to a more temporary problem?

But what if

a person tried to allow the instant to happen, would he not
fear and tremble in such a way that all the time bound theo
retical constructs of psychology would grow pale and become
silent.

Is psychology ever silent?

never cease?

Does the quest for knowledge

Can anyone but get on with his business of the day?

But suppose the instant occurs.
through into time.
answers Kierkegaard.

Suppose Eternity breaks

Wouldn't that too become boring?

"No,"

For finite man the infinite is not boring.

In this one case, when the finite and the infinite come to
gether repetition is beautiful.

It is only face to face with

the infinite that man blossoms into full manhood and realizes
his freedom.

Continually, however, the instant is hidden from

view and the moment tempts one to return to its embrace.

Only

the possibility of repeating the eternal in time can give man
hope to abandon oneself absurdly to the instant.

To expect

the future to be filled with more and more moments of pleasure
is not the expectation of one who lives in the instant.
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Repetition of the infinite has taken the future out of the
hands of time-bound moments and let the future come to rest
in the instant.

The moment by moment meastiring out of exist

ence has been overcome.
And yet isn't Kierkegaard's writing itself going to be
sucked up into this moment by moment consumption of everything?
Won't people start writing more either/or's about Either/Or?
Yes, they will and Kierkegaard no doubt expected it.

For

Kierkegaard offered to the mob-minded intellectuals his pseu
donymous out-pourings, but not as the truth but as that necessary
bit of flash which would deceitfully make it necessary for the
individual reader to consider the possiblity of The Truth.
the pseudonymous muses go on.

Let

Let distinctions be made ad in

finitum within the un-existential categories of non-belief.

To

come away from the pseudonymous muses as a non-believing ex
istentialist would have been an impossibility for Kierkegaard.
The only existentialist for Kierkegaard is the believer.

The

reader either finds momentary security in the pseudonymous
patterns of thought (becomes an either/or) or he abandons
pseudonymnity entirely and existentially becomes edified in
the 'Word of God.
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